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AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE 
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 
CARLO JEAN 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) enjoys the 
support of a larger percentage of the European public than does the 
EU itself (74% vs. 48%). The “war against terrorism” that 
followed the September 11th attacks on the US has proven once again the 
ineffectiveness of Europe’s response and presence. Like all common 
threats, this one has also fostered solidarity, cooperation and integration, 
but it has done so in the context of bilateral relations between the US and 
individual European states. Within Europe, these feelings have merely led 
to the approval of certain measures, such as the single European arrest 
warrant, which, whilst undoubtedly important, are of only marginal value 
to Europe’s international presence. 
If they are to meet the challenges o f the 21
st century, the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and especially the ESDP cannot base 
their effectiveness on intergovernmental mechanisms alone. There are 
significant gaps both between the public’s expectations and the actual EU 
political a nd strategic decision-making capabilities, and between 
Europe’s technical and military capabilities and its ambition to be a 
serious geopolitical actor on the global stage. The political-institutional 
gap can only be closed at the IGC scheduled for 2004, which should 
reduce the duality between the Council and the Commission. This 
duality, in fact, deprives the EU of its main competitive advantage vis-à-
vis other international organisations: the advantage of having all-round 
competences and resources. The High Representative/Secretary General 
of the European Council (HR/SG) could become a European 
Commissioner or be made equal to the President of the Commission.  
Closing the gap in operational military capabilities in order to carry out 
the “higher spectrum” of Petersberg missions seems even more difficult. 
It is unlikely that this can be achieved by the deadlines specified in the 
Helsinki “headline goal” and in subsequent European Council meetings. 
Although the IOCs (initial operational capabilities) were established by 
the scheduled date of late December 2001, the FOCs (full operational 
capabilities), whose attainment is scheduled for December 2003, will 
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have to be postponed, since bridging the existing differences seems 
impossible both from a financial and industrial point of view.  
All of this highlights the role of the civilian components of ESDP, and 
especially of an integrated EU civil policy force (or EUCIVPOL),
1 whose 
importance has also increased owing to more objective factors. 
Crisis prevention and area stabilisation interventions in regions outside 
the EU are no longer carried out from outside the involved society, but 
rather from within it. This is true not only because the concept of security 
has become much broader and more comprehensive than in the past, but 
also because security has become inclusive. These observations 
especially apply to Europe’s peripheries. 
Moreover, military occupation regimes and the implementation of 
international mandates are no longer as popular as they were in the past. 
An ever-increasing number of conflicts are internal, and not between 
states. No peace agreements are concluded - but only truces, which must 
be turned into a durable, self-sustainable peace by means of peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. These 
interventions also involve state institutions and apparatuses, including 
foremost the state’s “coercive power”,  which must be made efficient and 
put to the service of the public, rather than of the various warlords and 
belligerent factions. If it is not, no stabilisation or development process is 
possible. On the other hand, the local leaders with whom the truces have 
been concluded have opposite interests. Instability enables them to keep 
their political power on the strength of a consensus based on fear that 
hostilities might resume, and to amass personal riches by controlling the 
economy, be it legal, underground or criminal. The chances of achieving 
stabilisation closely depend on the successful severance of the links 
between politics on the one hand and common and economic crime on 
the other. 
The hard experience acquired in the course of past interventions, 
especially in the Balkans, has made it possible to correct the unrealistic 
assumptions that informed our approaches in the past. First, there was the 
illusion that a truce equals full-fledged peace, rather than being a mere 
step on the path towards stabilisation. Secondly was the expectation that 
the political leaders who signed a truce were actually prepared to 
cooperate. Lastly – and most important of all – was the presumption that 
                                                                 
1 Although the term has not been officially adopted, it seems acceptable since it 
mirrors that of UNCIVPOL, which is increasingly used by the UN Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations. AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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civil society should be changed prior to the transformation of the state 
and its institutions. Conversely, priority is given today to the latter task, 
and first of all to the reconstruction of the state’s “coercive power”, 
formed by the law-enforcement triad of the police, judiciary and the 
penitentiary system. Clearly, this coercive power cannot exist in a void, 
but must refer to a legitimate political power. 
EUCIVPOL can be employed in two different situations: as a substitute 
for a non-existent local police force (in the case of failed states, such as 
Kosovo), which implies taking over the executive powers of the police; 
or as assistance to the local police (including monitoring and training, 
although the possibility to carry out some robust public order operations 
and to protect international organisations should not be ruled out), as 
happens in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Clearly, the second situation is 
also a subsequent phase of the first. In no sector is the impact of the local 
ethical and juridical culture and social structures felt as much as in that of 
crime prevention and repression. Therefore, local elements must be 
involved from the start and, as soon as there is a legitimate political 
power, the whole law-enforcement system must be transferred to it, 
although with continued monitoring, assistance and support by the 
international community. The Bosnian experience taught us that the 
process should progressively gravitate from the local police station to the 
central administration (focusing on management functions, including 
legislation, and on control, including compliance with democratic 
policing rules and human rights).  
The action of the civil police (CIVPOL) component, moreover, must 
always be immediate, to provide international leaders – whether military 
or civilian  – with specialised capabilities in public order and security 
maintenance from the very first stage of the intervention, as well as to 
prevent local warlords from exploiting emergency aid and the beginning 
of reconstruction in order to consolidate their power over the territory and 
the economy. The economic-financial police component can also play a 
crucial role. Agreement on the strategic and operational direction of all 
the intervention components is essential, as is preventing short-term 
measures from hampering long-term stabilisation. 
The basic principle, which should be implemented at all levels – political, 
strategic and operational or theatre - is unity of command. Clearly, this 
does not mean total uniformity of the relevant bodies at the various 
levels, for the peculiarities of each component must be taken into 
account. Nevertheless, unity of command has not yet been achieved, 
which has a negative impact on EUCIVPOL effectiveness.  CARLO JEAN 
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At a political level, the Police Unit is providing valuable advice to the 
HR/SG and to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). However, 
there is no single body or position that can use it authoritatively. The 
establishment of a Deputy HR/SG for the police sector (who may extend 
his competences to the whole “coercive power” spectrum) has been 
proposed. He would also avail himself of the Police Unit, after it has been 
appropriately reinforced. The individual national representations at the 
PSC should  include a police leader who is also a representative of the 
national Chief Commissioner. These representatives would operate in 
close contact with the Police Unit in case of emergency. 
At the strategic level, the Police Unit should also take over warning, 
situation and force requirement assessment, strategic planning and force 
constitution roles. It must be stressed that, whilst the EU will rely on 
NATO for the military forces, it must possess its own planning 
capabilities for the police forces. At any rate, the Police Unit must report 
to the PSC and work in coordination with the EU Military Staff (EUMS), 
especially in the first stages of any intervention, which are the most 
difficult and risky. Moreover, it should have the capability to 
immediately dispatch an advance party into the theatre, which would be 
in charge of assessing the local situation as well as determining 
quantitative and qualitative force requirements. It can be incorporated 
into the High Police Commissioner/Police Commander (PC) 
Headquarters in the employment theatre.  
The operational level must be headed by the PC, in his dual task of 
advisor to the EU Special Representative (with the status of his Deputy) 
and of the person responsible for all the activities carried out by 
EUCIVPOL. The idea that the PC should be hierarchically subordinate to 
the Deputy HR/SG for Police should be ruled out in favour of a 
functional coordination link only, for instance in the sector of new force 
requirements. Theatre OPLANs (operational plans) should be approved 
in-theatre, and not in Brussels, as much relates to the peculiar nature of 
police activities, which are more specific and closely linked to the local 
realities than those of the more centralised military forces. This 
suggestion also corresponds to the fact that, especially in the first phase 
of intervention, the latter have a more reactive character, whereas police 
action is more preventive and pro-active, especially in the intermediate 
and final stages of intervention, when a reasonable level of public  
security has been reached. Moreover, whilst the military follow a top-
down logic, the police (clearly, within limits) adopt a bottom-up logic, 
since they operate from within the involved societies rather than outside 
of them.  AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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The PC should be immediately appointed by the EU or pre-designated 
according to a rotational mechanism (ideally, on a three-year basis) 
among the countries that contribute at least 300 EUCIVPOL personnel, to 
which minor countries would be associated. The EU member country that 
provides the EUCIVPOL Commander should also keep its HQ, complete 
with the necessary C
3 (command and communications control) system, 
available. This system would also make it possible for the EU (Deputy 
HR/SG for Police and Police Unit) to direct the appropriate training 
activities (especially command post exercises (CPX) and field exercises 
(FTX)). In the case of especially exacting operations, such as those in 
Kosovo or in peacemaking, it may be desirable to assign the major 
nations’ first-intervention police u nits with the same sectors of the 
respective military units, clearly maintaining the option of inter-sectoral 
manoeuvre. This would simplify logistical support, decrease language 
barriers, enable better cooperation and stimulate the member states to 
provide all the necessary forces, even beyond their pledged contributions. 
Training courses may be carried out with the support of the Central 
European Police Academy (CEPA) and the Association of European 
Police Colleges (AEPC). 
The above-described organisation seems appropriate both for EU-led 
interventions and for cases in which the intervention is led by another 
international organisation and the EU is entrusted with the “police” 
sector. If the EU is not granted a complete and well defined sector of 
activity, it is preferable that it does not interfere in the bilateral relations 
between the member states and the lead organisation, in order to avoid 
delays, misunderstandings and red tape. 
Member state contributions should not be merely quantitative, but also 
qualitative, meaning that the whole spectrum of police activities should 
be covered. National specialisation could be interesting, since the various 
European police forces have widely different statutes and cultures. For 
instance, those countries that have m ilitary-statute police forces might 
provide the bulk of the multi-specialised units (MSU); others might 
specialise in the field of economic-financial police; while others still 
might be responsible for training, and so forth. As a general rule, 
command positions within the European forces should be assigned on the 
basis of the share of the total represented by any member state’s 
contribution. Lastly, financial sanctions could be envisaged against states 
that fail to meet their contribution pledges for whatever reason. 
The Police Unit, with the assistance of the Central European Police 
Academy, the Association of European Police Colleges and possibly the CARLO JEAN 
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WEU Institute for Security Studies, should develop a doctrine of 
democratic policing  – harmonised with the UN Department of Peace 
Keeping Operations (UNDPKO), the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe doctrines – as 
well as framework documents on the SOFAs (Status of Forces 
Agreements), the SOMAs (Status of Mission Agreements) and (SOPs) 
Standard Operating Procedures, etc. Special provisions should regulate 
the following functions: personnel selection, especially regarding 
personnel from non-member countries; logistical support and C
3 systems 
to be adopted; cooperation with other international organisations and with 
the military forces; the use of experts in human rights; the actions of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (including defence counsels, 
prosecutors, judges, etc.); and the disciplinary powers entrusted to the HQ 
and the financial sanctions that the EU can adopt against member states 
in the event of non-compliance. 
 
 
 
  
7 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This report focuses on a variety of issues related to an integrated 
European civil police force (or EUCIVPOL, a s we call it), including 
doctrine, structures and tasks. The Presidency Report to the Göteborg 
Council on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), is by far 
the most comprehensive document written on the matter by the EU to 
date. 
Chapter 2 of this report examines the socio-political context in which the 
Petersberg missions are carried out. It identifies the special requirements 
that must be met by security and law-enforcement packages. These 
packages are represented by the “police-judiciary-penitentiary system” 
triad, which is crucial for implementing the “rule of law”. In its absence, 
one can only achieve stabilisation, public order and security maintenance 
– and nothing more. In particular, similarities and differences are 
highlighted in the establishment and employment of European police 
forces as compared to military forces. In particular, whilst the latter 
operate from outside the involved societies, police forces operate within 
them. This distinction gives rise to different problems both in doctrine 
and in intervention management. A less crucial distinction, at least from 
the point of view of organisational and strategic theory, exists between 
preventive action, which allegedly pertains to police, and reactive action, 
which is apparently typical of military forces.  
In reality, the military also endeavours to carry out its mission by means 
of deterrence and force, which are typical elements of the “diplomacy of 
violence” and are crucial factors in any type of strategy, including that of 
peace-support operations. No artificial barriers should exist between the 
different components of an international intervention. The paramount 
principle to be followed at any level is unity of command, a “force 
multiplier” which the EU must exploit owing to the fact that it possesses 
all-round resources and competences. This feature gives the European 
Union a unique competitive advantage compared to any other 
international organisation. Current arrangements in the EU, however, 
both in its leadership and within the General Affairs Council, seem to 
inhibit the Union from exploiting this advantage to its fullest. 
Chapter 3 examines the various decisions taken by the EU on 
EUCIVPOL and reports on the status of their implementation. Moreover, 
reference is made to similar initiatives by other organisations, especially CARLO JEAN 
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the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. EUCIVPOL will have to 
take these initiatives into account to avoid duplication and contradictions 
in its concepts and organisational/doctrinal principles, as well as to retain 
the option of incorporating police contingents supplied by non-member 
states or to support other international organisations that may lead the 
intervention. The chapter also outlines ways in which experts from non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) can provide support. 
Particular reference is made to two of the most significant cases of police 
deployment in peacekeeping operations, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and 
Kosovo, both of whose mandates and tasks have very different 
characteristics. The former  corresponds to the first model  – that of 
monitoring and assistance  – which are carried out by the IPTF 
(International Police Task Force) included in the UN Mission to BiH 
(UNMIBiH), although some executive order and public security 
maintenance tasks have b een entrusted to the NATO-led stabilisation 
Force (SFOR)-Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU). The second 
corresponds to the “substitution” model, with the direct take-over of 
executive police responsibilities by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
Police Force. It is generating the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), formed 
by locally enlisted and OSCE-trained personnel whose equipment has 
been donated by the International Community (IC). In both cases, a 
phased approach must be followed, meaning a progressive transfer of 
powers to the local authorities by milestones or steps, which should be 
realistically defined so as not to hamper the unity of the triad. The first 
phase always consists of incorporating local elements into the 
international force. The last phase, which is a prelude to the withdrawal 
by the international forces, can only be implemented when the political-
institutional situation has stabilised and a political power to which 
“coercive power” can be referred has been established. If the latter did 
not exist, coercive power would have no basis and would serve the local 
faction chiefs rather than the citizens. State reconstruction, therefore, is a 
paramount priority in all peacebuilding interventions. The experience in 
the Balkans has helped to overcome the previously dominant idealistic 
approach, which envisaged post-modern states and postulated 
democracy-building prior to state-building. 
Chapter 4 examines the above-mentioned EU institutional problems, 
which do not merely involve EUCIVPOL but also apply to ESDP (and 
also to CFSP) as a whole. Failure to provide adequate solutions to these 
problems may result in a decoupling between the “hard” and the “soft” 
aspects of the European foreign, security and defence policies as well as 
in coordination difficulties both in force generation and in the overall AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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intervention strategy. If an improvement were not achieved, the EU 
would be deprived of one of its primary competitive advantages 
compared to other international institutions, i.e. its command of all-round 
resources in the military, economic and institutional spheres. Therefore, 
the effectiveness of its interventions would be seriously impaired, as 
mentioned above. 
The fifth chapter focuses on international coordination and command and 
control issues and also refers to the cases of both EU-led and non-EU led 
interventions. In this respect, the main goal is to provide EU efforts with 
as much identity and visibility as possible, overcoming the excessively 
“ecumenical” and unprioritised list of possible missions outlined by the 
Swedish Presidency in Göteborg. 
Chapter 6 analyses the technical problems that must be solved to 
establish and employ EUCIVPOL, with special focus on the “doctrine” 
and guidelines of employment. An assessment is made of the 
correspondence of the personnel contributions by the EU member states. 
The latter are more qualitative than quantitative, although in the 
Ministerial Police Capabilities Commitment Conference, the quantitative 
headline goal of 5,000 police officers has roughly been reached. 
Moreover, the problems stemming from the diversity of statutes and 
regulations among the various countries’ police forces are also examined, 
ranging from equipment interoperability, the lack of a clearly established 
European doctrine of democratic policing and coordination with military 
forces, to selection and training issues and the possible roles of Europol 
and the Central European Police Academy, whose Board of Directors met 
last year in Stockholm. 
The conclusions in the final chapter summarise the main findings of the 
research and recommend solutions intended to make EUCIVPOL fully 
functional. The role of EUCIVPOL in ESDP will increase for several 
reasons. First of all, objectively speaking, the rapid reconstruction of the 
“coercive power of the State”  is becoming increasingly essential for 
stabilisation and to streamline the expensive military presence. Secondly, 
because the attainment of the full operational capabilities (FOC) 
envisaged in the Helsinki headline goal will probably have to be 
postponed, unlike that of the initial operational capabilities (IOC), and 
therefore the EU’s international visibility as a global geopolitical actor 
will solely depend on its capability to effectively carry out the “low 
missions” of the Petersberg spectrum. EUCIVPOL is a core component 
of this capability.  
10 
 
CHAPTER 2 
POLICE FORCES IN THE PETERSBERG MISSIONS 
2.1   The Political-Strategic Context 
The West has lost its capability to decisively use military force, defined 
as achieving victory in the field that can be turned into a political success, 
i.e. a durable peace. It is no longer willing to occupy the territories in 
which it has intervened in order to restore international law, project 
stability, reorganise and transform institutions, promote the advancement 
of ethical-political cultures in line with Western standards and to develop 
the economy. The interventions carried out by the West are not merely 
aimed at implementing its principles and values. They also serve its 
interests in an increasingly globalised world the leadership of and the 
responsibility for which fall in its hands. 
Since these interests are not vital, however, the West is not prepared to 
adopt such policies and strategies that would be adequate from the point 
of view of their political-strategic efficiency. Not only is it unwilling to 
accept the related costs and risks, it is also not prepared, as will be 
discussed later, to pursue such policies at the cost of sacrificing certain 
“politically correct” assumptions that are widespread in its political 
circles and public opinion. For instance, the West is unwilling to formally 
impose war-occupation regimes in which the administration and basic 
public services, especially those relating to public security and law 
enforcement, are placed under military command. Moreover, it is not 
prepared to establish mandates or international trusteeships – at least 
formally. There are some cases, however, in which it is forced, de facto, 
to implement these measures progressively, under the pressure of the 
circumstances, and with doubtful effectiveness, forfeiting the advantages 
that would have been provided by initiative-taking, surprise and mass 
action, which are the only conditions that can stabilise countries whose 
societies have been fragmented by conflict and massive bloodshed. First 
of all, it is necessary to rebuild the state, its coercive power and “law and 
order”. Only when a reasonable degree of security is established can the 
international intervention keep its credibility and change the situation. 
Moreover, only a clear perception of the willingness to employ all 
necessary legitimate force makes it possible to prevent crime and 
individual violence, which increase during all civil wars. AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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In cases of ethnic, civil or cultural conflict, the West has been satisfied 
with truce agreements, which are usually negotiated with the very persons 
who were responsible for the conflict and the massacres. Although these 
agreements do put a stop to the fighting and to the most odious forms of 
violence, they do not bring peace; rather, they are but mere stepping-
stones towards peace. In the eyes of local political leaders, a truce 
imposed by the international community is simply a continuation of war 
by other means. Unfortunately, it is politically correct in the West to 
assume that the opposing parties will comply with the truce agreements 
and turn them into long-lasting peace. Therefore, in order to promote 
peace under that political fiction, the West assumes the burden of 
carrying out long, difficult and expensive peacekeeping, peacebuilding 
and post-conflict rehabilitation operations. Moreover, the protraction of 
instability is often a personal benefit for international officials and NGOs, 
since it turns relatively well paid temporary jobs into permanent 
positions.  
There is a risk that a vicious circle emerges, obstructing stabilisation 
efforts. Only bold, robust, realistic and intrusive political control can 
overcome this danger. First of all, there is a need to conclude the “cultural 
revolution” underway, which involves a re-evaluation of the crucial 
importance of the State and its monopoly of legitimate force. The 
ideologically-inspired and procrustean approaches that were, and 
unfortunately still are followed have caused many failures in the past, 
undermining the effectiveness o f such an important component of the 
international community’s peace interventions (see Tanke Holm and 
Espen Berth (eds),  Peacekeeping and Policy Reform, London: Frank 
Cass, 2000).  
It is to be hoped that the EU adopts more robust and, at any rate, more 
responsible logic and strategies. In this respect, another recurring slogan 
must be highlighted, i.e. that the solution to a crisis must be political, not 
military, or that at any rate it cannot be imposed only by external force. In 
a conflict-prevention phase, the statement is usually made to postpone all 
decisions to intervene. In the post-conflict rehabilitation stage, it is often 
used to justify international pliancy towards the local faction leaders. 
Clearly, no solution can be military (using the term i n its extensive 
meaning of enforcement from outside). Nevertheless, the type of political 
solution – that is, the type of peace – that can be implemented generally 
depends on the effectiveness of the use of both real and virtual force. CARLO JEAN 
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The disastrous events in BiH and the current difficulties in stabilising the 
country largely stem from the adoption of such assumptions, which do 
not correspond to the harsh realities of civil war. 
The nature and the goals of the operations envisaged in the Petersberg 
missions are much more far-reaching and ambitious than those of similar 
operations – the so-called “1
st-generation peacekeeping” operations – that 
were carried out during the Cold War. At the time, peacekeeping mainly 
consisted of interposing international military forces between the 
belligerents, after they had concluded a truce. “2
nd-generation” 
peacekeeping operations are profoundly different. They are not confined 
to separating the belligerents along a predetermined line and with both 
parties’ agreement. They are much more complex and also involve areas 
that do not pertain to the military sector proper. They extend to peace- 
and institutions-building, and usually also comprise elements of 
peacemaking and peace-enforcement. The international forces no longer 
operate from outside the societies. They also operate from within, by 
promoting and supporting the pacification of “hearts and minds” and the 
adoption of necessary institutional, socio-economic or other reforms, if 
necessary imposing them by means of the powers usually conferred on 
them by the UN Security Council. 
As illustrated by the UN Brahimi Report on the future of peacekeeping, 
the latter is adopting an increasingly comprehensive concept of its tasks 
in international peace and security maintenance, extending them to 
internal political issues and most notably to humanitarian aspects and the 
safeguarding of human rights, which in the past was considered the 
exclusive domain of each sovereign State. 
Clearly, in the initial stages of stabilisation and pacification, and in the 
later process of political, social, economic and even psychological 
rehabilitation, public order, security maintenance and law enforcement – 
the so-called “internal stability triad” – play a key role. In building and 
adjusting the local i nstitutions and public services to international 
standards, a crucial aspect consists of the reconstruction of police forces 
trained to act in line with international standards, that is, according to 
democratic policing rules. Equally important is the creation of an 
impartial judiciary and a prison system that complies with respect for 
human rights. 
The shifting objectives of international interventions are also mirrored in 
the ever-increasing weight of the “civilian police” component within 
UNDPKO, and in the fact that international police contingents form an 
average of 10-20% of the total military personnel employed in the current AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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peacekeeping missions. It must be stressed that the EU headline goals 
consider a smaller percentage as compared to the figure reported by the 
Brahimi Report. 
The situations in which international police forces may be called to 
operate are extremely variable within a range between two extreme 
models. At one end, there is a scenario in which state and public 
structures – although distorted by civil war – are sufficiently efficient or, 
at least, still exist. In this instance, as happened in BiH, international 
police forces are entrusted with monitoring the behaviour of the local 
police and with supporting and assisting them in streamlining, training 
and restructuring local institutions. The principle of “ownership” should 
be followed, although the population often demands a more direct 
intervention by international police forces. In fact, the latter are perceived 
as more impartial and trustworthy than the local forces, which often have 
ties to paramilitary militias and to political and common crime groups.  
The international forces must guarantee anti-riot and public order and 
security maintenance tasks in the initial stages of post-conflict 
interventions. In BiH and Kosovo, these areas are entrusted to adequately 
trained and equipped military-statute police units placed under the NATO 
military command, the above-mentioned MSU, which operates in close 
coordination with military forces both in order to avail itself of their 
operational and logistic support and because both carry out similar tasks 
in the anti-terrorism sector and against paramilitary groups. 
At the other end of the scale, when local institutions have totally 
collapsed or are non-existent, the international forces actually replace 
them until the local institutions and public services have been 
reconstituted. In particular, in such cases, international police forces are 
also given powers to carry out executive policing tasks, from traffic and 
border control to law-enforcement and investigation activities. Obviously, 
this solution requires the presence of other elements of the law-
enforcement package, namely prosecutors, judges, solicitors and the 
prison system. The lack of a single one of these components prevents the 
whole system from working. 
Clearly, taking such responsibilities is no simple matter, both because of 
the sensitive issue of legitimisation  – also in the eyes of the local 
population  – and because of difficulties d eriving from the juridical 
cultural differences between the local society and the individual countries 
supplying the investigators, prosecutors and judges. These difficulties 
should not be dismissed by simply assuming that the underlying 
principles are shared, especially as regards the protection of human CARLO JEAN 
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rights. Indeed, there are significant differences even between the single 
European police forces regarding their statutes and behaviour, for 
instance, concerning the relative priority they attach to the investigative 
search for material evidence versus the interrogation of suspects. 
A particularly crucial aspect involves public order and security 
maintenance. In this sector international police forces, possibly with 
military statute, are assigned to the military force headquarters, as in the 
cases of BiH and Kosovo. Especially in the first stages of international 
intervention, when the military and paramilitary units of the battling 
factions have not yet been brought under control and the wish for 
retaliation still predominates, anti-riot units must closely cooperate with 
military units. By the way, this is only possible if the latter have the 
needed firepower to tackle serious crises. The fact that some European 
countries have no military-statute police should not be used by certain EU 
member states as an excuse for failing to provide the international forces 
with this component, which is in charge of the most important and also 
most dangerous tasks, which may trigger reactions by the residual 
warring elements. In the absence of a strong deterrence – defined as both 
the availability of adequate power and a credible will to use it if 
necessary – the situation can easily deteriorate. 
International police intervention has also proved very useful in conflict 
prevention. In this context, a vital role is played by the monitoring of the 
whole law enforcement cycle (“triad”), to ensure its impartiality 
(especially in ethnically divided countries, such as the FYROM – Federal 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, its compliance with the international 
human rights standards and its balance and proportionality in the 
repression of the guerrilla groups that are still active in certain areas. This 
role is usually entrusted to an international verification mission, but in 
less complex cases it may be entrusted to the police forces in charge of 
assisting and monitoring the local ones. 
Basically, current peace operations comprise a much wider range of 
activities than those of the past. The military forces are no longer 
entrusted with the exclusive (or even the main) responsibility for the 
intervention. The civilian component is acquiring increasing importance – 
clearly, only after a reasonable degree of security has been reached, that 
is, when the opposing military and paramilitary factions have been 
neutralised or destroyed by the military peace forces. 
Another feature that differentiates current interventions from those in the 
past is that now international (inter-governmental) organisations and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) operate simultaneously, from the AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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first stages of conflict and humanitarian emergency to post-conflict 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. This gives rise to further coordination 
problems both from the political-strategic and the operational points of 
view. Ensuring NGO security can be a heavy burden on international 
police and also on the military forces. In some circumstances, it may even 
engage a substantial part of the available forces, also owing to the NGOs’ 
political importance and to their appeal for western media coverage and 
because the international operation leaders are afraid of being blamed for 
failing to prevent possible incidents. Only at the tactical level, in the field, 
is cooperation actually easier, because it can be carried out pragmatically. 
Moreover, necessity promotes cooperation. At a higher level, it is more 
common to find ideological considerations and theological disputes on 
issues of principle, such as the separation between civil police and 
military forces. This solution, which is quite effective in Scandinavia and, 
although to a lesser extent, on the East Coast, hardly reflects reality, for 
instance, in the Balkans. It may be implemented after the Balkans have 
adopted the social structures and the ethical-political culture of a 
Scandinavian country;  but until then it will produce curious results, 
undermining the prestige of the international community and hampering 
internal stabilisation.  
To sum up, at a higher level, everyone urges coordination, but no one is 
willing to be coordinated by somebody else.  
It must be underlined that coordination difficulties within the various 
components of international interventions are compounded by objective 
difficulties in the field. First of all, as was pointed out earlier, the 
assumptions that truce agreements actually equal peace accords and that 
the political leaders who signed them are also willing to help implement 
them and to turn them into durable and self-sustained peace often induce 
intervention leaders to adopt unrealistic approaches. Truce agreements 
are signed by the leaders of the very factions that were previously 
fighting one another. None of them has suffered a final defeat, and they 
all retain their means of control over the institutions, the population and 
the local economy. In particular, they make use of informal structures 
(secret services, paramilitary units, etc.) as well as of the local police 
forces, which have strong political and personal allegiances to the local 
faction leaders, especially at a municipal level, to intimidate judges and 
economic operators. In this way, parallel structures are maintained which, 
in order to ensure their own political survival and enrichment, exercise 
real power against the objectives pursued by the international community 
and which are formally supported by legal structures that are all too often 
devoid of actual power. CARLO JEAN 
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Moreover, they retain their control over the criminal economy, which 
they used to finance the civil war. Post-conflict situations everywhere are 
extensively marked by the so-called “hybrid criminality”. This type of 
criminality, which is sometimes labelled as “patriotic”, is always 
intertwined with politics, especially with its most radical and nationalist 
elements, which provide it with legitimisation and protection. 
Therefore, the context in which international police forces are called to 
monitor the local police, to assist them and to cooperate with them is very 
difficult. In addition, they lack the necessary powers and resources as 
well as, quite often, adequate security guarantees. Actually, the faith in 
the willingness to cooperate by local politicians, who often are little more 
than “ethnic entrepreneurs”, and even by the local populations, which the 
international intervention leaders are obliged to purport, partly to avoid 
contradicting the truce-makers, does not consider the psychological 
polarisation triggered by the fear of a resumption of the conflict and of 
outbursts of revenge.  
It can only be hoped that the EU’s police “doctrine” for the 
implementation of the Petersberg missions is based on a realistic rather 
than an ideological approach, and that those responsible for the European 
interventions keep in mind the teachings of French Marshal Lyautey, the 
pacifier of Morocco, who is still remembered with respect and admiration 
in that country. However, the Report of the Presidency at Göteborg is not 
in line with this hope. The impacts are extremely negative not only in the 
law enforcement sector but in the others too, because of the decline in 
prestige and the perception  of inconsistency and indecision that is 
associated with the whole intervention. Moreover, the local population 
always finds it hard to understand the reasons for the presence of an 
international police force that does not protect them from violence and 
bullying by the local forces. In BiH, although on a different level and 
despite some positive results, situations have often emerged that are 
similar to the one that produced the UNPROFOR (United Nations 
Protection Force) disaster. 
2.2  Stages of a Complex Intervention: International Police 
Force Tasks 
The most complex operations, which must be used as a primary 
parameter to outline operational doctrine and force goals, comprise a 
series of necessary stages. The Kosovo intervention, in which, despite 
dualism between NATO and the United Nations (a notable progress, by 
the way, as compared to the deficient coordination system adopted in BiH AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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– which, however, is being progressively improved), coordination was 
better from the start, is an example in case and could be used as a model 
for the EU intervention doctrine, especially regarding cooperation and 
coordination between the civilian and the military components. The 
underlying logic must be based on the difficulties peculiar to each of the 
two force categories, on their individual vocation, their different time-
scales relating to deployment and the fact that the rate of actual 
availability of police forces is lower than that of the military ones. 
Military forces will always be more rapidly deployable in the theatre of 
operations than police forces. Moreover, they will always have better 
logistics and more efficient command, control and communications 
systems. At last, NATO’s standardisation efforts, the Partnership for 
Peace programmes and – especially since the end of the Cold War – the 
spread of military multinationality, have increased the interoperability of 
EU armed forces, including those of EU member states that are not 
NATO members. 
In NATO-led interventions, the CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) 
component, which can rely on civilian expertise provided by each armed 
force’s mobilisation system, will always be more immediately available 
in the field. In this respect, it must be highlighted that the structure, tasks 
and organisation of CIMIC have dramatically changed since the end of 
the Cold War. In the past, the primary task of military forces was to 
defend the territories of NATO member states, and CIMIC had the role of 
facilitating their employment in NATO operations, avoiding interference 
and accessing all possible support provided by the civilian authorities. In 
other words, the role of CIMIC was subordinated to military needs. 
Today, on the other hand, the very nature of CIMIC has changed. Its 
objectives are planning, organising and managing military support to 
humanitarian interventions and post-conflict rehabilitation operations, 
cooperating with both the local authorities and the other international 
organisations. NATO’s new CIMIC doctrine has been successfully tested 
in Bosnia and Kosovo. It should be taken as a model of the doctrine that 
the EU Military Staff will develop for ESDP and as a basis for both 
military-civil cooperation and special activities such as civil protection. 
The Multinational Specialised Units (MSUs) formed by military-statute 
police units placed under the command of NATO HQs in BiH and 
Kosovo can be considered as specialised components of CIMIC. This 
component will be examined in detail further on. For the time being, it is 
sufficient to highlight the effectiveness of its organisation and of the 
employment criteria it adopts. CARLO JEAN 
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A Kosovar- or Bosnian-type intervention generally comprises three 
successive phases that must be consistent with one another, meaning that 
the long-term objectives must be kept in sight while planning short-term 
contingency initiatives. In some cases, however, such as in BiH, 
inconsistencies have considerably reduced the effectiveness of the 
international action. The same happened in Kosovo, where the delays in 
ensuring control over the territory  – owing to both t he lack of police 
forces and the resistance by the military against any “mission creep” – 
enabled retaliatory ethnic-cleansing campaigns against the ethnic Serbs to 
take place, thus undermining the long-term restoration of multi-ethnicity 
in the region.  
In the first stage, the primary role is played by the military forces. They 
must guarantee security not only externally but also internally, by 
disarming paramilitary units, ensuring control over the territory and 
regulating and providing logistical support to the return of refugees and 
displaced persons. In this case, it is desirable that all powers, both in the 
military and in the civilian sectors, are entrusted to the military 
Commander or to a special envoy of the European Council or of the 
HR/SG in case of autonomous EU operations. This issue is very 
controversial in the EU, but a decision should be taken as soon as 
possible, focusing on intervention effectiveness, not on parochial 
approaches. Effectiveness mainly depends on unity of command and on 
clear-cut responsibilities. 
The first stage must be as short as possible. During it, some EUCIVPOL 
staff elements should be embedded in the intervention forces HQ, with 
the task of advising the military Commander on policing matters, of 
ensuring the employment of police forces (including MSUs, whose tasks 
mainly cover public order, anti-riot activities and territory control) as they 
become available, of preparing the deployment of the civilian 
intervention organisation, of assisting the military units in the public 
security monitoring and border police tasks, of protecting EU civilian 
structures and of establishing liaisons with local police and law-
enforcement bodies (which the Göteborg Council defined as “rule-of-
law” bodies). As soon as an appropriate number of police officers have 
been deployed, they may start more autonomous activities under the 
command of the Special Representative of the organisation directing the 
intervention. Many cases should be considered in defining the 
EUCIVPOL chain of command and control. The intervention may be 
carried out by the EU alone, with or without support by other 
international organisations (OIO), or by one of the latter with EU support. 
In the latter case, it would be advisable to have a single individual in AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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charge of the EU contribution, both as a whole and in its components 
(military force, police, emergency rescue, reconstruction, etc.). Clearly, 
this solution is hampered by the states’ tendency to act through direct 
bilateral relations with the intervention-leading organisation if they are 
members of it, rather than through another organisation of which they are 
also members. In short, coordination of the European contribution can 
only be envisaged in case the intervention is led by a non-European 
regional organisation or, secondarily, in case of UN-led intervention.  
In the second stage, EUCIVPOL should acquire full responsibility for 
“law and order” under the command of the Representative of the HR/SG 
in the field. To this end, the legal framework for such activities must be 
clarified. Moreover, EUCIVPOL must be provided with executive law-
enforcement powers, so as to be able to carry out its own criminal 
investigations beside monitoring the behaviour of local police and 
checking its compliance with international standards, to extend its 
monitoring activities to the judicial and prison systems, to maintain 
public order and security and, lastly, to recruit, train and equip the local 
police forces, to whom these powers will be progressively transferred: at 
first, under close monitoring and with job-training activities by 
EUCIVPOL and, thereafter, with increasing autonomy, when the 
institutional and administrative system has been rehabilitated. Without 
the re-establishment of a legitimate political power, such political and 
institutional transition cannot occur. Once again, the priority of 
peacebuilding means the rehabilitation of the state. Without it, police 
would operate in a void and its institutional links would be unclear. 
The main difficulties arise during the transition from one stage to another, 
when inaction or bureaucratic parochialism may also arise. As a general 
rule, transition must be implemented in an extremely cautious and 
progressive way. The transition between the first and the second stage 
may be carried out through the progressive transfer of the units in charge 
of public order maintenance under civilian command, whilst more robust 
anti-riot activities stay under military command. In Bosnia, the MSU is 
subordinated to the SFOR Commander, whilst the IPTF is headed by the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General. Both SFOR and 
UNMIBiH want to have the unit under their command and control. Until 
now – fortunately  – dependence on NATO has prevailed, although, as 
BiH progressively stabilises, the demands to place it under UNMIBiH 
command and control will intensify. Subordination to the military 
command makes it possible to implement the Blue Box concept, which 
would be virtually impracticable if the MSU were dependent on a 
different organisation. The concept should be confined to emergency CARLO JEAN 
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cases, in which international public order maintenance is to be viewed as 
exceptional and, at any rate, as a means of the last resort. Moreover, 
whilst in the first stage it is EUCIVPOL that provides support to the 
military commanders, with both its expertise and its troops, in the second 
stage the roles are reversed. It is the military command that provides 
support to civilian police activities, for instance in controlling the 
territory or in countering serious public order disturbances. In fact, only 
the military forces have the necessary firepower to neutralise paramilitary 
units or guerrilla-type groups, which are always the most dangerous 
components in the opposing factions. 
Obviously, the more rapid the succession of these stages, the greater the 
success of the whole operation and the greater the opportunity of 
streamlining and finally withdrawing the international presence. The 
latter, in the law enforcement sector, must progressively shift from the 
exercise of executive powers, to monitoring activities and to assistance, 
training and cooperation tasks. 
Other tasks that must be implemented to establish the “rule of law” in the 
Petersberg intervention areas are to provide assistance in the adjustment 
to international standards of criminal and criminal procedure laws as well 
as of prison regulations and procedures, and to help recruit, select and 
train local elements, also resorting to the assistance of experts provided 
by international organisations such as the Council  of Europe and the 
specialised NGOs. In these sectors, the EU should profit from the 
experience of other organisations such as the UN and OSCE and align its 
procedures and mechanisms with those envisaged by them, thereby 
avoiding not only useless work but a lso duplication and the resulting 
confusion. Moreover, it will also improve the effectiveness of 
cooperation between EU countries’ police forces and those of non-EU 
countries, especially non-Western ones, whose force pledges will be hard 
to reject for understandable political reasons, but whose behaviour and 
legislation often differ from the “democratic policing” concept of EU 
countries. In this respect, the relative homogeneity of police forces across 
the EU is one of the crucial common added values in EU programmes for 
the establishment of a consistent civilian capability of crisis management 
and post-conflict rehabilitation. 
In short, the tasks EUCIVPOL must carry out in the different stages of an 
intervention envisaged in the Petersberg missions coincide with those 
currently carried out by the UNMIK police. Undoubtedly, the 
constitution of Police Rapid Reaction Capabilities will call for an AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
 
 
21 
improvement in deployment rapidity (under 30 days) in public order 
operations, in staff and in logistics. 
To avoid the difficulties that emerged in the operations in the Balkans – 
where stabilisation efforts quite often did not focus on the region but on 
the balance of visibility, responsibility and power between the different 
international organisations and their members – priority should be always 
given to unity of command, which should shift from the military to the 
international, and subsequently to the local civilian political authorities 
according to the phase of intervention. Any parochial tendencies should 
be opposed. Only unity of command can make efficient cooperation and 
transparent responsibilities possible, avoiding chaos and 
misunderstandings. In the first stage, in principle, EUCIVPOL will 
support the action of the military command, in which it must have a 
multifaceted role both as an advisory body and as a provider of specific 
expertise in democratic policing and in the rule of law. Clearly, 
EUCIVPOL elements must be embedded in the local commands of the 
intervention forces. If the territory is subdivided into national sectors, the 
civilian police elements of the main EU countries, i.e. those that supply 
most of the personnel and resources, should be tentatively assigned to the 
same responsibility sectors as their national military forces. At least in the 
first phase, anti-riot units must be subordinated to the military 
commanders, with whom they must closely cooperate and from whom 
they must receive logistical and operational support in the control of the 
territory, the disarmament of the fighting paramilitary groups, freedom of 
circulation and public order and security maintenance. 
In the second stage, after the international civilian organisation has 
become operational, EUCIVPOL will acquire normal police tasks and 
autonomy from the military which, in turn, has to shift to the civilian 
officials responsible for the intervention. This second phase, as far as the 
relationship between the military and police forces is concerned, could be 
anticipated if the situation is sufficiently calm and stable. In this case, the 
Blue Box concept developed in BiH and Kosovo will be accentuated. 
According to this concept, the military units present in the area of 
responsibility (AOR) are assigned to the police forces for a specific 
robust police operation and are placed under their tactical control. The 
Blue Box is defined both in space and in time. Moreover, the police tasks 
should be expanded to the sectors other than public order, etc., as soon as 
possible. To do so, EUCIVPOL may be granted executive law 
enforcement powers, which not only presupposes a clear mandate and the 
availability of international criminal and criminal procedure laws, but 
also requires that all problems relating to differences in the juridical CARLO JEAN 
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culture of the various EUCIVPOL components and especially between 
them and the local population and police are overcome. 
The police tasks which should be transferred to the ESDP civilian 
component as soon as possible include those relating to border and traffic 
control, prison surveillance, as well as the recruitment, selection, basic 
and on-the-job training of the new local police officers. The international 
police forces must also continue to monitor the local police, especially in 
the stage before the actual trial, which is when most cases of misuse of 
power and  human rights violations take place. Indeed, systematically 
giving priority to the interrogation of suspects rather than to the collection 
of evidence by means of a patient and time-consuming investigation work 
is the main way in which the local police forces – or their paramilitary 
instigators – retain control over the population and protect the warlords’ 
arbitrary power. Democracy cannot be established without effecting a 
deep change in the ethical-political culture of the local law enforcement 
actors in o rder to turn the system into a genuine “rule of law”. In 
particular, the police must be directed by an impartial judicial system 
(including judges, but especially prosecutors) and therefore operate in the 
service of the law and of the citizens rather than in that of the different 
political clans or local factions and leaders. In this shift of missions, the 
anti-riot (public order) units expand their tasks to other police sectors of 
action, and particularly to territory control, to actions against organised 
crime, to prevention and so forth. 
Only when the whole local law-and-order/rule-of-law as well as the 
political establishments are sufficiently stabilised, will it be possible to 
transfer all powers to the local authorities. The pace and timing of the 
transfer will vary according to the individual situation and must be 
devised so as to prevent two opposite problems. If the transfer is 
premature – often because of the uncritical acceptance of “ownership” 
criteria – it may hinder the stabilisation process and reinforce the local 
warlords’ power. If it is belated, on the other hand, it may generate a 
“dependency complex” in a key institutional sector such as coercive 
powers, thus making it necessary to prolong the international presence 
and taking back responsibilities from the local politicians and officials. 
The latter, indeed, may use the intervention forces’ activities as an excuse 
to avoid mediation work and compromises, which are always difficult 
and exacting if not dangerous, especially in the aftermath of ethnic and 
cultural conflicts, when any measure that is less than harsh towards the 
remaining minority is perceived as a betrayal of the cause of their own 
people. AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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An especially crucial and sensitive issue is that of financial police 
activities and intelligence services, which are entrusted with internal 
security and anti-corruption, anti-crime and anti-terrorism tasks. To date, 
these aspects have not been adequately discussed in the various European 
Councils or even in the General Affairs Council. Presumably, this is due 
to the fact that the situation has not yet progressed enough to find a 
convergence among the stances of the various EU member countries. 
As far as financial police and the contrast of “money laundering” are 
concerned, a possible solution may envisage their being included in the 
economic-financial component of EU interventions. The “war against 
terrorism”, including its financial components relating to the funding of 
terrorist networks, has created an opportunity to develop serious 
mechanisms in this sector. Incidentally, there is a need to impose clear 
clauses, compliance with which is an essential prerequisite for the 
granting of EU financial aid, in order to avoid what happened in BiH. 
There a massive influx of resources from abroad strengthened the local 
political-criminal circles and their control over the economy in the 
absence of an effective central authority, thus promoting the 
fragmentation of the social, political and institutional fabric. 
The issue of intelligence services is basically similar to that concerning 
the same area in the employment of military forces. In particular, in a 
post-conflict situation, HUMINT (human intelligence) is crucial in both 
the military and the police sectors. However TECHINT (technical 
intelligence), and especially its SIGINT (signal intelligence) component, 
could play a very useful support role. 
2.3  Similarities in and Differences between Civilian and 
Military Aspects of Conflict Prevention and Crisis 
Management 
The ESDP comprises military and civilian components. The latter, in 
turn, are subdivided into different specialities and intervention areas. The 
Göteborg European Council highlighted, in particular, the establishment 
of a European rapid-intervention civil protection force, whose headline 
goal calls for 2,000 civil protection operators, a staff and a nucleus of 
experts and capabilities specialised in the various sectors. Similar 
initiatives are under study in the institutions and administration 
reconstruction sector. Comparable projects are also being considered by 
other organisations as well, including the UN, the OSCE (whose REACT 
project – Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams – is actually 
the model to which EU refers) and the Council of Europe. CARLO JEAN 
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The military and the civilian components are marked by considerable 
differences concerning the opportunities they offer to establish standing 
or on-call multinational forces, the willingness of the states to establish 
them and the basic criteria that must be used to define force requirements 
(both qualitative, depending on the tasks that must be accomplished, and 
quantitative, depending on the will and actual capabilities of the states to 
contribute national resources). 
Military forces are more rapidly available and are organically provided 
with  self-sufficient capabilities in the areas of political-strategic and 
operational-tactical planning, command, control, communications and 
intelligence, transportation capabilities both on long distances and within 
the region of intervention, logistics, supplies, repairs and medical 
services. Afterwards, they could be dedicated, although the normal 
practice is double- or triple-hatting. Moreover, their NATO-standardised 
procedures guarantee a high degree of interoperability, also as far as 
terminology is concerned. In addition to all this, sending military 
contingents abroad does not affect the internal security of a country, as 
long as it is not threatened by a conflict. By contrast, police forces are 
usually needed to ensure security in the national territories and their 
intervention abroad often requires a reorganisation of their normal 
structure. Moreover, public order emergencies, which are unpredictable, 
can always occur. In other words, earmarking police forces for an on-call 
EUCIVPOL force is much more difficult than earmarking military units 
for an intervention force, whatever contribution has been pledged by the 
various countries. Lastly, in external interventions, military units are 
employed without changing their normal organisation and usually each 
unit (company, battalion and also brigade) is organised on a one-nation 
basis. This makes cooperation significantly easier, also from the 
psychological-cultural and linguistic points of view. 
As far as international police forces are concerned, employment 
conditions are totally different, with the possible exception of anti-riot 
(public order) units, whether they have military statute (such as the Italian 
Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza or the French Gendarmerie) or 
civilian statute (such as the French CRS or the Italian State Police Mobile 
Units), which can be sent abroad without altering their structure and with 
their own logistics supports and C
3I systems. 
Moreover, whilst the European military units, partly due to the 
harmonisation work promoted by NATO, share the same professional 
culture, structures and employment doctrine or, at least, have very similar 
ones – even though the impact of different strategic cultures, perceptions AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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and political interests found among the various countries’ contingents 
should not be underestimated – police forces are significantly different in 
the various states. Indeed, their statutes and their juridical-operational 
structures largely differ. The effect of these differences is compounded by 
the particular features of international peace-support initiatives and by the 
special tasks that police forces are required to carry out. 
Also the “framework documents” envisaged by the Nice Summit to 
homogenise, standardise and make interoperable the police forces, cannot 
overcome these basic differences. As far as their statutes are concerned, 
some EU countries have military-statute police units along with civilian 
ones, whilst others only have the latter. In some countries, most ordinary 
and special police forces are centralised at the state level, whilst in others 
they are subordinated to the local authorities. Some countries usually 
employ their armed forces in support of police forces (for instance, for 
sensitive points security); others strongly reject such a mixture of roles. 
In some countries, police forces are unarmed; in others they are armed 
and may even possess considerable firepower. 
Differences in juridical culture are just as significant. Criminal procedure 
laws and police-prosecutor relations are very different from country to 
country, even overlooking the fact that some countries’ systems do not 
envisage a structural separation between prosecutors and judges. In some 
states, priority is given to the enquiry process; in others, the interrogation 
or even the imprisonment of  suspects on the authorisation of the 
prosecutor’s office is more central. 
Lastly, whilst even very different military forces can cooperate in an 
international context without too many difficulties  – since their 
differences are usually accounted for by entrusting them with tasks of 
different complexity and engagement – levelling the differences among 
police forces is much more difficult. Monitoring or direct law-
enforcement tasks require police to operate in small nuclei, in close 
contact with the population as well as with the local police and 
administrative bodies. They are immersed in the local society and act 
both from within and outside it. This clearly causes many difficulties, 
especially when following the UN practice of organising even small 
teams on a multinational basis whilst involving as many member states as 
possible to guarantee impartiality. Apart from logistical difficulties 
within the individual nuclei, natural tensions arise at the police 
intervention stage. For instance, within the IPTF in B iH, some 
contingents threatened withdrawal if they were armed, others threatened 
the same if they were made to operate unarmed. Problems have arisen CARLO JEAN 
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relating to food supplies, personal hygiene, human rights interpretation 
and so forth. In BiH, moreover, further difficulties have derived from the 
local population’s failure to understand the limits to the powers of the 
international police, which often had to confine themselves to urge the 
local political and police authorities to respect their laws and to guarantee 
impartiality and human rights protection. If the preconceived, ideological 
“soft-heartedness” which dominates many international organisations and 
which is used to justify their inefficiency is not relinquished, EU 
interventions, too, are bound to be less than brilliant (which is definitely 
an understatement, at least as far as Bosnia is concerned). 
A particular problem may lead to a revision of the whole EUCIVPOL 
planning. The existing technological gap between the European and the 
U.S. military forces is widening, hampering their interoperability in high-
intensity operations. The dwindling European defence budgets will only 
allow achievement of a small part of the 58 objectives of the Defence 
Conventional Initiative (DCI) identified at the April 1999 Washington 
NATO Summit. Regarding the Helsinki “headline goals”, the military 
component realised the IOCs (Initial Operational Capabilities) by 
December 2001, but it will have to postpone  – by up to 10 years, 
according to unofficial estimates not taken into account in the Laeken EU 
meeting in December 2001, implementation of the FOCs (Full 
Operational Capabilities), scheduled for 2003. In view of this situation 
and of the concrete risk of an implosion of the “enlarged Middle East”, 
Europe’s contribution to the United States will be forced to specialise by 
geographical areas or by roles. Thus, the process that had already 
emerged during the Gulf War and in the interventions in the BiH and in 
Kosovo will become consolidated. From the geographical point of view, 
the priority region for European intervention will likely be sub-Saharan 
Africa, where the US is very reluctant to intervene and where 
interventions in the “low spectrum” of the Petersberg missions can be 
envisaged. Specialisation by role will involve the less “hard” and less 
technology-intensive aspects of security, obviously along with the “soft” 
aspects. In view of this, EUCIVPOL may increase its political importance 
within CFSP and ESDP. That is why the related issues should be tackled 
with determination, in close coordination with the Brahimi Report 
provisions and with the orientations that have already become 
consolidated within UNDPKO. It is especially crucial to solve the issue 
of the availability of both qualitative and quantitative personnel. 
In conclusion, there is a clear need to find a solution and to provide such 
pre-mission training as to guarantee that the police personnel and units 
supplied by the different countries have adequate standards as well as to AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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ensure that experts in the different sectors involved in the European 
police action in the Petersberg missions are available. The issue has been 
repeatedly discussed within the EU and the solutions outlined to solve it 
seem adequate to provide ESDP with an appropriate degree of 
effectiveness in this particular sector, thus lending a significant added 
value to participation by individual member states in actions under EU 
control and coordination. 
Moreover, as has already been stressed, it seems indispensable that 
EUCIVPOL organisation and action are viewed in the context of security 
and law enforcement packages that take into consideration, without 
preconceived exclusions, the contribution that can be provided by the 
military forces, and especially by CIMIC structures (and by the Civil 
Emergency Planning – CEP), as well as by the NGOs. 
Clearly, the Status of Forces Agreements and the Status of Mission 
Agreements must adequately take into account the need for coherence 
among the various components of an international intervention (for 
instance, ROE (rules of engagement) compatibility between the military 
forces and the anti-riot police units, especially in the first stages of an 
intervention) and the adjustment of the general doctrine principles to the 
specific situations. To do so, great flexibility is called for, both in the 
intervention management policy and within the intervening forces. 
Flexibility may be hampered by the influence of the different cultures, 
but also by the “unionisation” of police forces and by the fact that the 
powers of i nternational force commanders are always more restricted 
than those of national force. 
Finally it should be hoped that, unlike what happened in the case if the 
military component of ESDP and the Helsinki “headline goal”, the 
constitution of EUCIVPOL does n ot translate into an exercise in 
institutional proliferation, but in the real improvement of capabilities or in 
the creation of currently unavailable ones. Unlike the military rapid 
reaction capabilities, RRCs, this task may be reasonably attained even in 
a short period of time.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EU DECISIONS ON EUCIVPOL –  
THE BIH AND KOSOVO EXPERIENCES 
3.1 European Council and European Union Decisions and 
Relevant Studies on CIVPOL in Peacekeeping, 
Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation 
It is unnecessary to report on and summarise the various EU decisions on 
the establishment of the civilian police components of ESDP and of a 
European capability in the civilian aspects of crisis prevention and 
management. The main decisions were taken at the Cologne, Helsinki, 
Feira, Nice and Göteborg meetings of the European Council and in the 
EU Chief Commissioners’ meetings, in which the headline goal of 5,000 
officers, 1,000 of whom deployable within 30 days, has been agreed. 
Moreover, the definition of specific goals in connection with 
strengthening the rule of law has been considered, and general guidelines 
have been approved. 
In particular, opportunities for the involvement of EUROPOL and of the 
Central European Police Academy (CEPA), the Association of the 
European Police Colleges (AEPC) as well as the role of the Task Force of 
Chief Commissioners of EU Member States and of the WEU Institute for 
Security Studies should be assessed. Moreover, useful support can be 
offered by the Northern Baltic Police Academy and by the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs, which conducted some penetrating 
research on the issue. Also the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
in London is preparing an Adelphi Paper on the European Civilian Police 
in the implementation of the Petersberg missions. 
Guidelines on the employment of civilian police in peace-support 
operations are currently under study within the UN, especially following 
publication of the Brahimi Report. A draft “doctrine” for civilian police 
interventions is also on-going within the UNDPKO. 
Useful ideas can also be developed on the basis of the experiences made 
in the REACT programme (Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation 
Teams), which was passed by OSCE at the November 1999 Istanbul 
Summit and which is headed by the CPC (Conflict Prevention Centre). 
Also NATO’s CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) doctrine could be of 
interest, as well as those of NATO’s CEP (Civil Emergency Planning), in AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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order to highlight similarities and differences with the decisions relating 
to EUCIVPOL and any aspects relevant to the organisation of the latter. 
The reports to various international forums and the papers delivered in 
numerous seminars and workshops by both civilian and military officials 
responsible for the international peace forces have special relevance, 
especially those prepared by the Chief Commissioners or by the 
commanders of the police components of those forces. Various bilateral 
or multilateral agreements and initiatives which have been adopted by the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, by the Central European 
Initiative, by the Adriatic Initiative, and by the SECI (Southeast Europe 
Cooperative Initiative) on the issues of police forces and the law-
enforcement package in general. Special consideration should be given to 
existing cooperation agreements in the financial, anti-crime and anti-
terrorism sectors. In the financial police sector – from the war on money-
laundering to anti-corruption actions – interesting initiatives have been 
adopted by the IFI (International Financial Institutions) and between 
them, by the EIB (European Investment Bank) and by the EBRD 
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), as well as within 
the Stability Pact (in both Tables I and Table III.b“B”). 
The decisions taken by the Council of Europe, especially in the criminal 
law and criminal procedure law sectors, which are planned for 
implementation both in the cases in which the international authorities 
only provide monitoring and assistance in post-conflict stabilisation and 
in those in which they are called to take over all police powers must be 
examined. They are relevant also because they clarify concepts such as 
“respect of universally-recognised human rights”, “democratic policing” 
and “international standards of policing”, which are often used in 
connection with police intervention and judicial and prison systems in 
international peace operations, but which are not clear at all. 
In pursuing the goal of EU autonomous intervention capabilities both in 
non-military and military aspects of crises, the need must be stressed to 
avoid duplication and to ensure that the legislation developed in the 
sectors of SOP (Standing Operating Procedures), SOFA (Status of Forces 
Agreements), SOMA (Status of Mission Agreements, which should al so 
include rules of engagement standards), is consistent with the public 
order and security legislation developed by the UN, but also by the OSCE 
and NATO. All of it should be included in the “framework documents” 
aimed at guaranteeing a degree of interoperability and homogeneity from 
the points of view of doctrine, organisation, rules of engagement, CARLO JEAN 
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logistics, etc. of the European capabilities in the sector of police forces to 
be employed in crisis management and in EU peace interventions. 
All these rules should be sufficiently flexible to allow for adjustments to 
the particular situation of each intervention by the mandating institutions 
and especially by the commanders in the field. 
Conflicting legislation in this sector would make it more difficult both for 
EU member states to take part in operations with another lead 
organisation and for non-members to participate in interventions under 
EU responsibility. Moreover, the setting up of forces would entail 
confusion and their selection, validation and training would be less 
effective. 
3.2   Police-Military Relations as a Pivotal Issue of the European 
Doctrine 
Each intervention is unique, and involves a particular adjustment in the 
command chain to the particular situation. The assistance given to a 
government possessing a certain degree of legitimacy and efficiency in 
crisis-prevention situations is totally different from an intervention 
carried out in a failed or non-existent state where the effects of the civil 
war linger, including high volatility and a large number of weapons, and 
where many paramilitary groups are in more or less violent competition 
with one another.  
The doctrine must envisage the whole range of possible cases, starting 
from the most difficult and demanding situation through to one which has 
become stabilised and where a shift in responsibility between the military 
and the civilian command can be carried out. 
One basic principle does not lend itself to compromise: unity of 
command, the one means to achieve synergies among the different 
components of the intervention. It must be clearly codified by the 
doctrine, overcoming practical difficulties and any ideological or 
corporative resistance by either the military, the police or the civilian 
bodies. The difficulties encountered in BiH and Kosovo mostly stemmed 
from the lack of unity of command and from the deriving, paralysing 
inter-institutional rivalries. The flawed efficiency of the international 
interventions in BiH and Kosovo provides ample evidence of this. 
Clearly, such integration must  be based on priorities that can greatly 
change during the different stages of the interventions. 
In the beginning, a reasonable degree of security must be established as 
quickly as possible, neutralising and disarming the armed groups and the AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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residual paramilitary formations. Territory control must be taken over, de 
facto, by the intervention forces, also in order to prevent retaliation or 
counter-ethnic cleansing as happened in Kosovo. Later on, the focus of 
the intervention shifts to public order and security maintenance, whilst 
the tasks of protecting people and property continue. When the conflict 
marking the situation becomes less sharp, more normal law enforcement 
mechanisms can be adopted, at first to replace the local powers, and later, 
to monitor, support and assist them in order to enable the local authorities 
to take over coercive power responsibilities as soon as possible. Whilst in 
the first phase coordination powers (to be less ambiguous, the term 
authority should be used) must be entrusted to the commanders of the 
military intervention, to whom the other components must provide 
support; in the latter phases it is the military forces that should provide 
support to the civilian authorities, which are in charge of both public 
security and reconstruction. 
This logic – which has been underlined in the French Presidency’s Report 
to the Nice Summit (see Annex II, paragraph II “Policing Capabilities”, 
sub-paragraph 2 “Guiding Principles”) and seems a reasonable way to 
optimise intervention effectiveness  – is opposed by individual EU 
member states, military officers and police force commanders. 
As far as the former are concerned, their opposition is a matter of 
principle, which is substantially based on the curious conviction that 
democratic policing rules out any intervention by the military and that 
there is some quick fix that can suddenly change the situation as soon as a 
peace accord has been signed. Regarding the military, their opposition is 
based partly on the fear of “mission creep” and partly of the worry lest 
they might lose altogether or be forced to reduce their discretional power 
in providing support to the civilian authorities. Another factor is that the 
military organisation that has carried out interventions so far is NATO, 
which is unwilling to yield to the power of an external authority, 
especially after the disastrous “double key” experiences at the time of 
UNPROFOR. Basically, it is an expression of the progressive 
bureaucratisation of Western military forces, which proliferated in the 
long peace period of the Cold War. As far as police forces are concerned, 
their opposition is founded both on the institutional and policing habits 
and cultures of some countries and on reasons mirroring those of the 
military, that is, the fear of losing their autonomy. Other elements that 
may play a role in this respect are the natural institutional and corporative 
competition between the national military-statute police forces and 
civilian-statute ones, as well as some negative experience in the MSU, CARLO JEAN 
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which stemmed from technical competence shortcomings by the military 
commanders and staffs. 
Only a clear political decision by the highest European hierarchy can 
solve these disputes and determine if the military and the civilian 
components in the interventions should go their own ways, confining 
themselves to some rhetorical appeal for improbable synergies. Also a 
complete division, based on the assumption that the military is reactive 
(or proactive) and the police preventive, makes no sense, at least in the 
first phases of an intervention. Unity of command is vital. 
If even the European leadership cannot succeed in solving the problem, 
there seems to be no alternative, in the doctrine, to envisaging a large 
decision-making decentralisation of the civilian and military commanders 
in the field. Having to face the hard demands of reality goes a long way 
towards solving problems that had seemed unsolvable from EU offices in 
Brussels. Obviously, the process will be facilitated if all the aspects of an 
intervention are headed by a single commander, both at a strategic level 
and in the field, and if the latter is granted (or takes) a high degree of 
decision-making autonomy such as that exercised in Eastern Slavonia by 
UNTAES Chief, Ambassador Jacques Klein. 
The most interesting case studies which should be taken into 
consideration in order to develop EUCIVPOL doctrine are those of the 
IPTF (International Police Task Force), which is placed within the 
UNMIBiH, and of the MSUs (Multinational Specialised Units) which are 
subordinated to the SFOR in BiH and to the KFOR in Kosovo, as well as 
those of the UNMIK Police and of the OSCE Kosovo Police Service 
School. The latter is entrusted with selecting and recruiting personnel for 
the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and carrying out  with their basic 
training. The latter is followed by on-the-job training carried out in 
successive stages under the control by UNMIK Police officers.  
At least two points should be noted. First of all, the negative impact of 
the “enforcement gap” in the two above-mentioned case studies, both 
concerning the international police forces’ discipline and towards the 
local authorities and populations. Secondly, especially in BiH, difficulties 
arose from the separation of the police component from the military 
command. Whilst the “double key” inconsistency of UNPROFOR, which 
concurred to the Srebrenica disaster, was offset with the creation of IFOR 
(now SFOR) as far as the military aspects were concerned, a new 
fragmentation of responsibilities arose in the initial phase after the 
Dayton-Paris Peace Accords between the civilian and the military aspects 
of the international intervention. The only realistic solution is AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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incorporating in some way the police force into the military force mix, at 
least in the initial phase of the most complex and demanding 
interventions. Experience shows that this type of cooperation was 
sometimes implemented in the field, not only in the logistics sector, but 
also in the operational one (anti-riot interventions; removal of roadblocks; 
protection of minority returnees, etc.). The IPTF requested support by the 
military several times, also because of its ambiguous mandate – which, 
moreover, was changed during the intervention, causing confusion if not 
chaos. The degree of cooperation and synergy essentially depended on 
the personalities involved, not on the organisation. Now that the situation 
has improved, a discussion has been started with the UNMIBiH’s request 
to take the MSU under its control, whilst the military would continue to 
maintain a deterrence role by means of a reduced presence, surrendering 
their control of the territory and streamlining their present support to the 
civilian authorities. The IPTF would concentrate on providing assistance 
to the different Ministries (at state, entity and canton level), on the 
supervision (i.e. “light” monitoring) of the local police forces and on the 
training of the instructors of the two UN-created Police Academies in 
Sarajevo and in Banja Luka. 
The “signals” are not encouraging in this regard. In fact, the clear-cut 
concept in the Nice document was watered down in the Göteborg 
European Summit, which insists on the “rule of law”. In this respect, the 
EU apparently competes with the OSCE and with the Council of Europe, 
watering down its power, which is its main competitive advantage. At 
any rate, the rule of law is not central in the initial phase, because it 
cannot be implemented. Therefore, it is marginal compared to public 
security, law-and-order and law enforcement in view of the 
implementation of ESDP. This is not to say that in tackling the problems 
of emergency, the needs of longer-period stabilisation should not be 
given due consideration. However, the two issues should be kept quite 
separate and one should focus on the priorities, in particular those linked 
to the implementation timing. 
Some possible positive factors for improving cooperation between the 
military and police forces (and vice versa) are, on the one hand, the 
CIMIC organisations and, on the other hand, the presence of state-level 
and military-statute police forces. Mention has already been made of the 
former, highlighting the changes they have undergone since the end of 
the Cold War. As far as the latter is concerned – referring to those forces 
that must be considered police forces from any point of view, and not 
military police  – cooperation is made easier by the use of the same 
language acquired in the process of attending common courses. 
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CHAPTER 4 
POLICE FORCE CONCEPTS AND ESTABLISHMENT: 
POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
FOR EU PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
4.1 Police vs. Military Force  
The establishment of EUCIVPOL according to the headline goals decided 
upon in Helsinki and restated in Feira, Nice and Göteborg, and more 
generally the creation of a European intervention capability in the civilian 
aspects of the Petersberg missions is a more difficult task than the setting 
up of effective European military capabilities, especially the full ones.  
The RRF, already mentioned, operate from outside the local societies and 
preserve their normal national peacetime organisation down to the level 
of major units. This arrangement greatly simplifies the problem of 
language and cultural differences – although they naturally have contacts 
with the local institutions and population, in order to ensure their 
cooperation and consensus. Moreover, the military also employ local staff 
with logistical and administrative tasks. Only CIMIC activities are carried 
out in close contact with the local authorities and population. 
Moreover, CIMIC keeps contacts and coordinates, as far as possible, the 
military action with that by NGOs, which currently operate across all 
intervention phases, from the humanitarian emergency stage to 
rehabilitation of the social and institutional fabric. By the way, such 
cooperation  affects the overall consistency of international action in 
several ways, because of the NGOs’ political weight in the West and of 
their media appeal. According to some commentators, in BiH and in 
Kosovo there even exists a “shadow government of NGOs”, partly 
consistent and partly clashing with the policy followed by the 
international organisations and the governments.  
In an exclusively military sector, identifying operational and 
organisational standards is easier, also because sufficiently validated 
mechanisms of cooperation, Standing Operations Procedures (SOPs) and 
Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) have been established at 
international level, and because joint training activities have taken place 
for decades among the armed forces of those EU member countries that 
are also NATO members. Thus, there is a remarkably high degree of 
interoperability. Moreover, even non-NATO members have been 
involved in common exercises through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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programme and are accustomed to the standardised procedures agreed by 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). 
Moreover, the establishment of military forces in the EU is eased by the 
structural convergence process that has been taking place in all European 
armed forces since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the late 
1990s. In the past, things were quite different. Some armed forces were 
professional and had an overall overseas expeditionary corps posture. 
Other armed forces, since their almost only task was guaranteeing direct 
defence of the national territory, retained the mass-armies structure, were 
based on draft and on mobilisation and were scarcely oriented to 
interventions abroad, at least in their ground components. Now, all 
European armed forces (with the partial exception of Germany and some 
Scandinavian countries) have already been or are being transformed into 
professional forces, specifically earmarked for external interventions. 
This process and the growing integration in the European armaments 
industry make it much easier to generate integrated forces to meet the 
military needs of ESDP.  
Another reason why military strategic cooperation is easier is that the 
armed forces are structurally accustomed to planning long-term and 
global interventions and their requirements are more predictable, which 
makes it possible to develop a sufficiently reliable tactical and 
operational doctrine. As far as the use of police forces is concerned, the 
situation is quite different. Suffice it to consider the difficulties in 
calculating their needs and requirements, from both the quantitative and 
qualitative points of view. The standards employed in the Balkans (one 
international police officer for every 30 local policemen or 400 
inhabitants) have shown their limitations. They depend on extremely 
volatile paradigms, which are greatly influenced by the local situation. 
Lastly, in case of military intervention, the major country supplies most 
of the forces and especially the bulk of command, control and 
communications systems, providing the general framework in which 
usually small-scale contingents provided by other EU member or non-
member states are included. This way, firm leadership can be established. 
As far as the civilian police component is concerned, on the other hand, 
with the partial exception of the anti-riot units (for instance, the MSUs 
operating in BiH and Kosovo), the situation is fundamentally different. 
Engagement situations are more diverse and unpredictable and 
organisation in the field, ROE and command arrangements are extremely 
variable. This is compounded by the need to closely cooperate with the CARLO JEAN 
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local police and authorities, which considerably increases complexity, 
unpredictability and the peculiarities of each intervention. 
The various European police forces have extremely different 
organisations and cultures. Some states – such as Italy or France – also 
have “military-statute” general police units, whose normal tasks totally 
overlap with those of the civilian police. This civilian statute may cause 
some coordination difficulties even at national level, and also makes it 
necessary to ensure that all different national police components are 
represented in a balanced way in the European staff organisations. By the 
way, the existence of military-statute police corps – as mentioned above – 
provides the Union with useful “bridges” that can enhance cooperation, 
synergy and unity of the EU intervention. This would be crucial 
especially in the early stages of an intervention. 
4.2  Civilian Police Employment in Peace-Support Operations 
Moreover, international police forces must act within the local society 
(unlike the military forces, which act from the outside), with a law-
enforcement organisation that relies on (or that must, at any rate, rapidly 
include) international and local prosecutors and judges as well as local 
police officers. 
In addition, police forces usually operate in small teams which are also 
always entrusted with assisting and monitoring tasks, but which, in case 
of failed states or collapsed institutions, can also carry out  executive 
actions in the sector of criminal law. Their tasks are often restricted to 
public order and security, in which they closely cooperate with the 
military forces, especially in situations in which the local paramilitary 
factions have not been completely neutralised or disarmed. Local armed 
groups always have far more firepower than any international police 
force, including military-statute police, may conceivably possess. 
Therefore, they can only be disarmed through a massive intervention by 
international military forces. Their presence and the credibility of their 
intervention when needed create a useful deterrent framework. 
In this respect it must be added that, at least in BiH, the military 
authority, i.e. NATO, is legitimised to employ any necessary level of 
violence to implement the Dayton-Paris agreements, whilst the mandate 
of the civilian component, i.e. the United Nations police, does not 
envisage any such power. Therefore, especially in the early stages of the 
international intervention, whenever the IPTF identified human rights 
violations (especially against “minority returnees”), road-blocks or 
similar infractions, it was forced either to acknowledge the violation to AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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the Dayton Agreement and urge the local authorities to act so as to 
correct the situation, or to request a direct intervention by the NATO 
military forces, with the danger of employing excessive power. Military 
forces encounter obvious difficulties in controlling crowds and riots with 
too lethal means. Tanks cannot challenge a crowd that includes women 
and children, and the currently available non-lethal weapons are very 
limited in availability and effectiveness. There is a risk of triggering a 
vicious circle of action-reaction, which could rapidly lead to the 
emergence of a  “Mogadishu line” and to the collapse of the intervention. 
That is why military commanders strenuously resist any enlargement of 
their tasks, to avoid mission creep. The whole basis of the intervention 
should be mission-oriented, rather that risks-reduction oriented. The 
MSU placed under NATO command has overcome this difficulty by 
adopting NATO’s general ROE and adding special ROE for the use of 
non-lethal weapons (actually, reduced-lethality weapons) for public order 
and security maintenance purposes. 
In addition, it must be highlighted that, whilst the military component is 
dominated by the contingents provided by the largest states, in which the 
troops from minor states are integrated, international participation in the 
civilian aspects of the intervention, a t least in BiH, is far more 
fragmented. Rules should be developed not only on the personal 
standards of the police officers supplied by the various countries, but also 
on their professional standards and behaviour. All individual states 
should be called upon to contribute according to their vocations and the 
availability of specialised capacities (in the case of Italy, for instance, the 
existence of a military-statute financial and border police corps – the 
Guardia di Finanza – could be put to valuable use). Obviously, however, 
pledges by some non-EU member states will be difficult to reject for 
political reasons. Generally, this problem is not as serious within the EU, 
where reasonably homogeneous standards exist. 
The fragmentation of national police forces in many small contingents 
causes significant command and coordination difficulties, which are 
compounded by the above-mentioned problem of the high dispersal of 
police forces throughout the territory, where they operate without 
appropriate command and control and logistical systems. Incidentally, a 
synergy should be obtainable in the logistics fields, especially in the early 
stages of an intervention and if the EUCIVPOL national contingents are 
employed in the same sectors as the military ones. A duplication of 
logistic support would be expensive and would make no sense. If some 
EUCIVPOL parts are individually employed, in principle the situation 
should allow local logistics support. CARLO JEAN 
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The “nation-led operation” principle, which ensures coherence in the 
various sectors of NATO interventions, can hardly apply to the civilian 
police sector, at least in the case of UN-led or OSCE-led operations. In 
EU-led operations, however, the principle could be reconsidered, because 
it has an interesting potential to improve EUCIVPOL effectiveness and 
overall coordination, and could also partly solve the problem of language 
and cultural barriers. In case of UN or OSCE interventions, there is an 
imperative need to preserve perceived impartiality and to accept the 
presence of police contingents from countries whose regimes are not 
democratic and, at any rate, are not used to adopting Western rules of 
“democratic policing” (or may not even be inclined to follow the Western 
interpretation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). This 
usually makes it necessary for the UN to organise even small police 
teams with multinational participation. It ensures that Western officials 
are present everywhere to provide a clear guarantee of the respect of 
these rules and standards, but it also leads to a lack of homogeneity, 
which has a negative impact on efficiency. 
Another difficulty that must be realistically considered in the programmes 
for EUCIVPOL is that cooperation between different police forces is 
always extremely difficult also in the EU context. The existing 
cooperation initiatives (Europol, Schengen, etc.) are not fully integrated 
in the EU machinery and have tended to develop a life of their own 
without specialised bodies, such as Europol, but mainly on a bilateral 
basis, taking into account the political sensitivity of such cooperation. 
Actually, police activities, much more than those of the armed forces – in 
which there is a consolidated experience in international cooperation  – 
are viewed as a specific domain of state sovereignty, especially since this 
sector is closely intertwined with the national juridical and ethical-
political-institutional cultures, towards which all states feel possessively 
protective. Moreover, the implementation of police activities strictly 
depends on a strong consensus by the local population, and therefore on 
the thorough knowledge of the psychology and culture specific to the 
regions in which the intervention takes place. For this reason, the Chief 
Commissioners of the intervention forces must be provided with 
expertise not only in the juridical sector, but also in the anthropology and 
mass-psychology issues relating to the intervention areas, which are 
always marked by strong differences as compared to EU countries. 
Employing police forces with an Euro-centric vision and approaches is a 
sure recipe for failure. 
On the other hand, in the sector of the civilian aspects of the external 
interventions carried out within the framework of the EU’s CFSP and AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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ESDP, the delicate issue of relations with NATO – which raised and still 
raises so many disagreements for the military component – does not exist. 
The other side of the coin is that, in the police sector, the EU cannot 
benefit from NATO’s planning and operational capabilities. Therefore, it 
must develop its own political-strategic and operational planning 
capability, which is currently sadly lacking. This has extremely negative 
repercussions for the management of non-military aspects of the crisis, 
also because the tradition of many European countries rules out any close 
coordination between police and military forces, even though in many 
countries it is usual for military units to be employed in public security 
tasks, especially regarding static protection of sensitive infrastructure, but 
also participation in the control of the territory. Especially in the initial 
phase of any intervention, it is necessary to take advantage of any 
possible synergies among the different components, avoiding the creation 
of institutional, corporative barriers. 
4.3  Command and Control Structures in the EU General 
Affairs Council and More Generally at EU Level 
It seems indispensable that, regarding the civilian aspects of the 
Petersberg missions, the General Affairs Council is provided with an 
adequate capability of high political-strategic, planning and general-
management direction. This would require a general restructuring of the 
Comitè Politique et de Securité/Political Security Committee 
(COPS/PSC) and of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management, whose establishment was decided in May 2000. The bodies 
in charge of non-military aspects should not only mirror the configuration 
of similar military bodies, but also acquire intervention-planning and 
political-strategic management capabilities, including the opportunity of 
detaching teams provided with all the necessary expertise as key elements 
of the Staff of the Special Representative of the European Union and of 
the in-theatre Chief Commissioner or Police Commander. The latter’s 
designation should become a constant practice for any European-led 
intervention. He should have an overall responsibility for and powers 
over the military and civilian components of every mission. Only thus 
can unity, transparency and an adequate authority/responsibility balance 
be established. Clearly, the political European Head of Mission/Special 
Representative of the EU must have staff specialised in all sectors 
involved in the intervention. The different components’ commanders and 
leaders should be his main advisors and should have functional 
organisational links with the relevant specialised element of the Head of 
Mission/Special Representative staff. CARLO JEAN 
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Whilst the EU has made very rapid progress in its institutional adjustment 
for the military aspects – unfortunately, less than in the improvement of 
its operational capabilities!  – to date the progress made in the non-
military aspects of conflict prevention and crisis management has been 
limited, if not marginal, in spite of the remarkable efforts and 
achievements made in the most recent period. This point will be analysed 
in detail further on. 
Actually, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management has 
been created within the General Affairs Council. Moreover, the Chief 
Commissioners Task Force meets regularly. Lastly, a conference on 
capability contribution by the member states for Union-led interventions 
has been held. However, despite all efforts, the COPS/PSC which should 
become the pivotal body coordinating the military and civilian aspects of 
interventions, is marked by a definite imbalance in favour of the military 
component, for which the EUMC (European Union Military Committee) 
and the EUMS (European Union Military Staff) have been created. It 
must be stressed that the latter is a mere technical staff, not an operational 
command (actually, it is very similar to the International Military Staff of 
the NAC  – North Atlantic Council), since planning capabilities are 
provided by NATO or by a national strategic command, reinforced by 
personnel for all participating countries. 
Regarding the non-military aspects of interventions, the availability of 
qualified structures and personnel within the COPS/PSC and the 
opportunities of receiving external support by other international 
organisations have been extremely limited so far. They should be 
reinforced and expanded. It must be considered that the needs in this 
sector are unpredictable and its management is more difficult, starting 
from the identification of the forces needed in the field. Unlike in the 
military sector, there is no consolidated parameter to define force 
requirements. The parameters that have been adopted (police officers to 
population ratio, which in Europe averages one police officer for every 
400 inhabitants; the territory, the number of local police stations, police 
trainers to trainees ratio, etc.) are extremely unreliable, also because of 
the extremely varying degree of cooperation that can be provided by the 
local police forces. 
In assessing force requirements, “worst-case” situations must always be 
considered. As a  rule, they tend to be unlimited. In this respect, the 
experience of Kosovo may be useful, although it must be considered that 
the force goals must be referred to a case in which the EU controls the 
whole intervention and EUCIVPOL actually substitutes for  the local AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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police, rather than confining itself to monitoring and assisting them. 
Taking into account the European standards and the situation outlined, 
the headline goals determined by the European Council in the sector of 
civilian police could, in principle, enable the EU to take full 
responsibility in a region with about 2 million inhabitants, although 
further capabilities may be provided by member states or by external 
contributions. 
3.4  Institutional Dualism between the EU General Affairs 
Council and the EU Commission for CFSD and ESDP 
Apart from these problems, which involve the COPS/PSC level, the 
planning staff and the in-theatre intervention management bodies, 
including the coordination of military and non-military aspects, there is a 
basic structural difficulty deriving from the dualism of the top EU 
structures: the intergovernmental component headed by the HR/SG, the 
European Council and, through it, the General Affairs Council on the one 
hand, and the communitarian (or federalist) component headed  by the 
Commission and by its President, by the Foreign Affairs Commissioner 
and by the European Parliament. 
The foreign, security and defence policies cannot be separated into “soft” 
(for instance, emergency intervention, economic assistance, 
reconstruction, etc.) and “hard” components, entrusting them to the 
Commission and to the European Council, respectively. Not even the 
most sophisticated and cooperative coordination procedures and 
mechanisms or any amount of goodwill by those responsible can solve 
this difficulty, especially in unpredictable situations in which extremely 
rapid choices are needed and in which the political leaders’ media 
visibility is very high, thus increasing cooperation difficulties. The only 
way forward is to start a fundamental institutional restructuring of the 
EU. Clearly, this involves the very nature of the Union and the vision of 
its future (superstate, superpower, supranational intergovernmentalism, 
federation of national states, etc.) and of its role in the world. It must be 
hoped that, in the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference, this institutional 
issue is solved. However, it will likely be impossible to find more than 
partial, compromise solutions, which will have to be progressively 
developed during the interventions by means of goodwill, openness and 
flexible cooperation among those responsible for the different sectors 
involved in ESDP. 
The most logical solution in the eyes of those who believe there is a need 
to reinforce the communitarian or federalist component of the EU is the CARLO JEAN 
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same that was proposed for the whole of the CFSP and ESDP, i.e. giving 
the HR/SG the “double hat” of Member of the Commission (or, possibly, 
of its President). Therefore, in the first case, a double dependency, on the 
European Council and on the Commission, should be established. In the 
second case, the Commission would turn into a high executive body of 
the European Council. 
This solution would overcome, at least formally, several problems, 
especially the marginalisation of the Commission, since predictably 
CFSP and ESDP, which are intergovernmental by nature, will acquire 
growing importance and visibility as compared to other EU responsibility 
sectors. At any rate, the HR/SG should chair the COPS/PSC, with robust 
competencies and powers extending to all the military and civilian 
aspects of conflict prevention and crisis management. 
In the second case, if the President of the Commission were also 
entrusted with the role of HR/SG, the COPS/PSC should be chaired by a 
Commissioner in charge of the implementation of the CFSP and of the 
ESDP. As far as intergovernmental competencies are concerned, they 
would clearly continue to be the responsibility of the Council and the 
President of the Commission should continue to be an integral part of it, 
so as to prevent the erosion and marginalisation of his current position 
and visibility. If this solution is adopted, methods must be identified to 
contain the negative effects of the dualism. In fact, it may require a 
decoupling between the implementation of the CFSP and the ESDP, 
especially regarding military and police interventions abroad, and the 
other responsibilities in the “soft” components, which specifically pertain 
to the Commission. If the problem remains unsolved, it might deprive the 
EU of one of its main comparative advantages as compared to any other 
international organisation, i.e. having competencies and resources in all 
the intervention sectors. Forfeiting such a unique advantage would be 
ineffective. Pending approval of a new Treaty of the Union, perhaps some 
provisional arrangement could be found to maintain unity of command in 
EU interventions. 
This would enable the EU, whose member states have lost any practice in 
carrying out wide-scale initiatives of strategic significance, other than as 
a junior partner of the US, to become an actor on the international scene, 
especially in Europe’s “near abroad”, and to overcome the limitations 
linked to the priority of the Atlantic Alliance in all the interventions 
where its forces and political power can be involved in some way. 
Another crucial institutional military issue is which voting system  – 
consensus or qualified majority  – should be adopted in some sectors AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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involved in the CFSP and the ESDP. Even though the decision to employ 
their forces and to give the “EU” label to an intervention undoubtedly 
involves the sovereignty of the member states and therefore should be 
taken by consensus (with “constructive abstention” by the states which do 
not intend to take part in the intervention), particular aspects such as 
financing, humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction/ 
rehabilitation, logistical support, use of bases, transit and overflight rights 
of the employed forces, etc. should be adequately regulated, 
systematically envisaging “constructive abstention” and logistical and 
financial support by those member states that decide to directly take part 
in an intervention. 
Realistically, an EU member state will intervene only if its national 
interests are involved, including those of “European solidarity”. In any 
case, this contribution of delicate assets, such as police forces, will 
always depend on the importance of those interests. It can be reasonably 
assumed that coherence will be reinforced by the consolidation of the 
convergence of national interests and policies. However, there is a risk 
that some countries rely on other international organisations (i.e. the UN 
Security Council) rather than on the EU, thus eroding the Union’s 
CFSP/ESDP; that a permanent “coalition of the willing” forms within 
Europe, which might create imbalances and tension in the Union; that 
mere bilateral initiatives with the United States are agreed without any 
coordination with or involvement of other European member states; etc. 
To contain, if not to prevent, all these risks, the principle of priority of the 
European dimension in all international initiatives should be established 
and the EU should be involved as a mediator between the individual 
Member States and the other international organisations, at least in all the 
cases in which the European presence is dominant, also in a single sector. 
Unfortunately, this is an ambitious and partly unrealistic goal, owing to 
the particular position that some EU member states have within other 
international organisations, such as the U N Security Council. Its 
permanent members will undoubtedly reject the idea of having EU bodies 
mediate for them. 
In the European context, there are clearly other coordination problems. In 
particular, they are connected with the role that the European Parliament 
should play with regard to CFSP/ESDP and the residual role of the 
WEU’s Parliamentary Assembly. Sooner or later, a Parliamentary 
Assembly must convene, whose effectiveness will depend on the 
identification of a solution to make it representative both of National 
Parliaments and of the European Parliament. Moreover, the role of the 
Foreign Affairs Commission of the European Parliament should be CARLO JEAN 
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enhanced, it should take over competencies in CFSP/ESDP and, 
especially, it should be provided with the information and technical 
support needed to achieve adequate understanding of the issues involved. 
The more organic connection that has recently been approved between 
EU bodies and the WEU Institute for Security Studies could also be 
useful. In these mechanisms of parliamentary involvement, it seems 
desirable to envisage that the CFSP/ESDP issues are dealt with as a 
whole rather as individually, sector by sector. Therefore, EUCIVPOL 
should be seen in the context of the European initiatives for the 
implementation of the Petersberg missions in which the European 
Council has decided to intervene. The European Parliament’s 
involvement will play a more important role if common European 
conflict prevention and crisis management financing mechanisms are 
more firmly established. 
Whichever solution is selected in the sector of the EU-internal 
institutional structures and decision-making procedures, it will play a 
crucial role in the effectiveness of the CFSP/ESDP. It will also have a 
significant impact on the very nature of the Union. The ongoing delays in 
the sector of the civilian aspects of the Petersberg missions seem 
especially hard to justify, since in these areas there is no “theological 
divide” like that between EU, NATO and the US. The essential problems 
relating to coordination of the civilian aspects of crisis management are 
internal, not external, to the Union. Thus, the situation could improve 
rapidly, if the political will to do so emerges. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COMMAND AND CONTROL IN EU 
AND NON-EU-LED INTERVENTIONS 
5.1  EU-Led Operations 
The various European Councils’ Presidency reports have been repeating 
with depressing tirelessness that the ESDP is not aimed at creating a 
European Army, and that the Union will carry out interventions under the 
mandate of the institutions that are legitimised to take decisions on the 
Petersberg missions, i.e. the UN and, subordinately, the OSCE. At the 
Washington NATO Summit in April 1999, the Europeans restated the 
need for a UN Security Council mandate in all cases of use of military 
force. In the Helsinki headline goal, the concept was stressed that Europe 
would build divisible but not divided capacities from NATO. Therefore, 
Atlanticism has been selected as a basis for all EU military projects, also 
to defuse possible opposition to a “European fortress” or a “European 
power” and to reduce doubts and preoccupations on the establishment of 
European rapid reaction capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis 
management by those countries that fear that overly dynamic, if not 
aggressive, initiatives by the EU may weaken NATO. 
Moreover, the EU documents generally avoid making any direct 
reference to NATO, although it is within its organisation that individual 
EU countries carry out military cooperation with their main ally, the 
United States. This meets the orientations by those countries that want a 
more independent Europe. 
All these are no doubt minor ambiguities rather than diplomatic 
cautiousness, and they help to ease confrontation, to avoid stalemates in 
the decision-making process and to prevent tensions that may affect the 
Union’s cohesion and its chances of gradually deepening its level of 
integration. In fact, progress has been made in improving cooperation 
with NATO, through MOUs (Memoranda of Understanding) and SOPs in 
the military sector. The latter represent a most politically sensitive issue, 
even though their organisation and management are less complicated than 
those of other sectors, and especially those of the police field. A vast 
experience in military cooperation exists in Europe, where more than 50 
multinational formations have been established and where NATO’s 
STANAGs and SOPs are followed throughout the EAPC area because of 
the PfP programmes. In any event, implementation of the Helsinki 
headline goal has been very rapid, although it has consisted more of an CARLO JEAN 
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exercise in institution-building than in capabilities-building. It is 
reasonable to assess that the Initial Operational Capabilities (IOC) can be 
reached without problems, because they are essentially limited to internal 
reorganisation of existing capabilities and in a “creative double/triple 
hatting exercise”. On the other hand, the achievement of Full Operational 
Capabilities (FOC), which is scheduled for 2003, will likely be postponed 
by several years, especially in crucial areas such as C
4IRSTA, 
(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition) strategic transport, 
etc. This delay will confine the real possibilities of ESDP to the lower 
levels of Petersberg missions, making the upper ones (robust 
peacemaking and peace enforcement) dependent on close cooperation 
with, and in practice subordination to NATO.  
The contingency areas for autonomous EU interventions should be 
selected in the short term, taking into account the actual capabilities. 
Therefore, it is likely that the EU will concentrate on interventions 
similar to enlarged versions of the “Alba Operation”, led by Italy in 
Albania in 1997, in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, under UN aegis 
and with strong support by the US which, since the disaster in Somalia, 
does not intend to engage its forces in those areas. That’s why some 
commentators labelled the EU’s RRC a “future Afrika Korps”. Although 
such limitations are unacceptable, it seems reasonable to give priority to 
the crucial capabilities for those interventions, also in the EUCIVPOL 
sector. 
It remains to be seen whether the impact of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks in the US and the subsequent “war against terrorism” will 
continue to erode European political and strategic integration. The first 
reactions varied widely from state to state, and Europe as a global 
political actor disappeared from the international scene, at least from the 
military  – and therefore, from the political  – point o f view. It may re-
emerge in the post-war period as a main actor in the “soft power” 
measures for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and stabilisation. I personally 
doubt it, since the country will become a theatre of internal conflicts 
among various competing ethnic and tribal groups. Therefore, 
reconstruction will have to be guaranteed by a strong military presence 
that ensures a degree of stability and that, in any case, will not be EU-led. 
Therefore, the civilian component of EU intervention capabilities, and 
particularly EUCIVPOL, may become the main instrument of European 
presence, owing to the UN’s gravitating into the political and economic 
assistance sectors. At any rate, the role of EUCIVPOL might dramatically AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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increase in the very short time as compared t o the military and 
emergency-aid components. 
Paragraph II, “Options for Operations”, of Annex V to the Presidency 
Report to the June 2001 Göteborg European Council, “EU Cooperation 
with International Organisations in Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management”, lists a wide array of possible command and control 
arrangements. It covers the whole range of possible command and control 
systems for the contributions provided by the individual EU member 
states to international “lead agencies”, including EU autonomous 
operations. In this respect, six options for the presence of EU or EU 
member states are considered (individual national contributions without 
EU coordination; the same, but envisaging prior consultations with the 
EU in order to pool resources; coordinated contribution provided by the 
EU; key EU component under the leadership of another organisation; 
EU-led operations with contributions by non-member countries; 
completely autonomous operations led by the EU). In my opinion, the 
whole range can be reduced to  the latter two options only, which are 
relevant to the EUCIVPOL command and control system. 
The EUCIVPOL command and control structure should be similar to its 
military counterpart, even considering that “strategic planning” for 
EUCIVPOL will have to be developed at EU level, unlike military 
strategic-military planning, which will remain entrusted to NATO, since 
the creation of a European SHAPE is unlikely and the recourse to one of 
the seven existing combined joint commands or to “country-led 
operations” poses many problems.  
The political planning of EUCIVPOL must be headed by the PSC/COPS, 
which must be able to rely on technical support in the police sector 
similar to that available in the military sector. In case of massive 
intervention, it might be desirable to have a strategic level formed by a 
Committee of Chief Police Commissioners of the member countries or by 
their representatives, who should, as a rule, report to their respective 
national representations. 
The second solution (police representatives) seems preferable. In fact, the 
police forces used in “peace operations” operate within the involved 
societies. As a consequence, EUCIVPOL commanders in the field should 
be granted larger autonomy than military commanders, who essentially 
operate from outside the society and are closely integrated in the upper 
levels of military alliances or coalitions, also to guarantee deterrence 
through a rapid reinforcement from intervention units and support from 
airpower. CARLO JEAN 
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Basically, EUCIVPOL’s political-strategic command bodies in Brussels 
can be much more “streamlined” than their military counterparts, since 
the bulk of decisions will be directly taken by the Head of European 
Mission/Representative of the HR/SG and by his Chief 
Commissioner/Police Commander. For the  reasons mentioned above, 
their decisions depend on detailed knowledge of the local situation 
(including the degree of cooperation by the local police forces) which 
cannot possibly be obtained in Brussels. In my opinion, the bottom-up 
approach should be followed instead of the top-down approach in the 
EUCIVPOL sector. The structures at strategic and operational level must 
take this peculiarity into account. This conclusion is supported by the 
important ties that exist between the political and institutional 
rehabilitation activities by the International Community and those 
activities carried out by police – and, more generally, by the whole law-
enforcement triad. 
At a political-strategic level, the HR/SG and the PSC/COPS should have 
advisory capabilities in t he sectors of policing, situation assessment, 
possible deployment options of police forces for each situation and 
selection of the optimal choice, also in view of the current availability of 
EUCIVPOL personnel. This sector may be entrusted to a Deputy HR/SG 
for EUCIVPOL, supported by an autonomous staff capable of carrying 
out the activities pertaining to the political-strategic level, such as: 
•  Advice, first of all, on the appointment of the Chief 
Commissioner/Police Commander of the EU Petersberg mission. This 
is a vital political decision, which should be agreed with the EU 
Special Representative/Head of Petersberg mission. As an alternative, 
this role could be granted on a rotational basis to the member 
countries (the solution adopted for the Sofia Process and the 
SEEBRIG). A reasonable basis for rotation can be 2 -3 years. 2 -3 
countries may be associated in providing the Police HQ in the field, 
which will direct the exercises. One country that has pledged a 
contribution of at least 300 police officers should be included and it 
should provide the framework of HQ, of the command and control 
system and of the logistic system (see below). 
•  Strategic planning. 
•  Force generation and coordination with the member states’ Chief 
Commissioners through their representatives in the national 
delegations. 
•  Negotiations with the other international organisations. AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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•  Joint and combined training. 
•  Establishment of appropriate SOFAs, SOMAs, STANACs, SOPs, 
including support to the establishment of appropriate legal regulations; 
•  Coordination of police intervention with the other components of EU 
intervention. In the initial or emergency phase, priority should be 
given to coordination with the military and, afterwards, to 
coordination with the institutional rehabilitation in the sector of the 
state’s “coercive power”. In this respect, a typical example is the 
gravitation of IPTF action in BiH, which shifted from the monitoring 
of local police stations and activities to assistance to the various 
ministries at state, entity and canton levels. 
A Deputy SG/HR for Police Operations should be established. He would 
have the double hat of advisor to the SG/HR and the PSC/COPS and of 
functional supervisor  – point of contact  – for the mission Chief 
Commissioner/Police Commander. He should be supported by the 
existing Police Unit within the General Affairs Council and chair the 
meetings of the “Police representatives” in the various national 
delegations at the COPS/PSC or of the Chief Commissioners of EU 
member countries when they meet to discuss especially important issues, 
such as in the “pledging” of the various national contributions. 
The Police Unit – which, despite its recent establishment, has already 
achieved remarkable results – should be reinforced to rapidly assist the 
HR/SG for Police in all his political and strategic-planning duties.  
The unit should have the capability to immediately dispatch an advanced 
party into the intervention area to support the recommendations to the 
PSC/COPS or direct decisions by the Deputy HR/SG for police. He could 
be supported by the police representatives of the national delegations, 
who could act on a double-hatting principle. Incidentally, this might also 
improve the unity of EU planning and operation management. Owing to 
the unpredictability of the situation, the strategic process, that is, a 
continuous process of adjustment of the initial planning and concept, 
plays a pivotal role. 
As has repeatedly been stressed, it is essential to guarantee the unity of 
command in the various levels of intervention. Therefore, the police 
forces employed in the theatre should report to the European Head of 
Mission (Special Representative of the HR/SG), not to the Deputy 
HR/SG for Police Operations. The creation of a parallel chain of 
command must be avoided at all costs in  all sectors, including the 
military, for this would complicate the conduct of any operation to the CARLO JEAN 
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point of making it completely unmanageable and would cause 
misunderstandings, contradictions and tensions. Such an occurrence is 
especially dangerous since t he individual national contingents would 
keep close contacts with the respective governments, thus significantly 
complicating the functioning of EU. Incidentally, an example of these 
difficulties emerged in Kosovo, when the KFOR commander failed to 
obey the SACEUR’s order to precede the Russian contingent at Pristina 
airport. Since the police forces are more markedly decentralised, such 
damaging events should be considered more probable. 
Operational and tactical planning and management should be entrusted to 
the Senior Police Commissioner/Head of the Police in the theatre. 
He must be provided with very wide powers, to ensure he has the 
necessary flexibility. The strategic and the operational levels overlap, and 
the principle should be implemented to decentralise as much as possible, 
also to grant higher responsibilities to the Senior Police 
Commissioner/Commander in the field and not to disrupt the unity of the 
EU-led mission. 
The EU Police Unit Advanced Party, who should make an assessment of 
the situation, evaluate force requirements as well as the proposals on the 
political-strategic outlines of EUCIVPOL intervention, could be 
integrated in the Police HQ which guarantees the operational and tactical 
conduct of operations in the field. 
Regarding the latter, it seems necessary to make every effort to guarantee 
that the contributions to EUCIVPOL are as binding as possible, at least as 
far as HQ and C
3I systems are concerned. If not, the rotational principle 
would not be practicable and a standing, EU-funded HQ  of the ACE 
(Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force (Land) AMF(L) type should be 
established along with the relevant C
3 and logistics bodies. Although this 
solution might be optimal from a functional point of view, it would also 
be expensive. Moreover, it would risk assigning less responsibility to 
states that provide commanders and HQ in supporting the first 
operational readiness during the operation. In conclusion, the rotational 
“standing HQ” option seems the most appropriate. In the police field it 
will be  possible to provide not only for the constructive abstention 
principle, but also virtually automatic commitments. Those states that are 
available to approve this condition should accept the commitment to 
create a standing HQ provided with all the support b odies needed to 
conduct and support the operation. 
The Police Unit and the Police HQ in the theatre must guarantee 
coordination with the military bodies both centrally and in the AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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intervention area. In this respect, the provisions contained in Appendix II 
to Annex VI of the Nice Presidency Report still maintain full validity, 
although their contents have been significantly watered down in the 
Göteborg declaration. 
The greater realism that seems to be gaining ground in the EU, albeit 
laboriously, consolidates the idea that unity of command and the use of 
all the necessary legitimate force are indeed indispensable. Overly 
idealistic, Euro-centric and unrealistic approaches have already caused 
enough disasters (naturally, with the best of intentions!). The “step 
backward” taken by the Göteborg Council should be forgotten. It risks 
undermining the effectiveness of EU interventions and further affecting 
the credibility and the thrust of European integration. 
5.2  Non-EU-Led Operations 
As already mentioned, priority should be given to options in which the 
EU takes direct responsibility. Only thus can further progress be achieved 
towards the Union’s identity and integration.  
In any event, considering the political and strategic fragmentation of 
Europe that has clearly emerged in the “war against terrorism”, if the 
Armed Forces Staffs in the Union do not have a strong will to take part 
and if the EU does not have direct control of an operation, it is preferable 
for the individual states to enter into direct agreements with the lead 
agencies. EU involvement would not only complicate things, adding 
another interlocutor and therefore increasing delays and red tape, but 
would also cause tensions within the Union. Unfortunately the sheer 
number of international organisations and agencies  – which reject all 
external coordination, have their own logic and respond to their national 
constituencies  – is already causing significant difficulties, hampering 
intervention unity and consistency. The subdivision of tasks and 
responsibilities and the very organisational structure are often primarily 
designed so as to satisfy all members, thus fragmenting competencies and 
making international action less flexible, less consistent with reality 
(except, of course, that of the corporative interests and their lobbies and 
constituencies), and more difficult to manage. Priority is often attached to 
the internal stability/balances between the various international 
organisations and countries rather than to the achievement of the 
intervention goals,  that is, the stabilisation of the involved areas. The 
examples of BiH and – although to a lesser extent – of Kosovo should 
cause a taxpayers’ revolt. In the absence of strong political will and 
determination, efforts, resources and time are wasted, the rehabilitation CARLO JEAN 
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process is complicated to the point of blocking it, and the credibility of 
the international community is eroded by its implementation of different 
or even opposed visions and strategies.  
In fact, if the principle is not stated that the EU will intervene only if it 
can autonomously direct an intervention or at least a sector of it (for 
instance, police forces), the goals of achieving larger visibility for Europe 
and therefore of its CFSP/ESDP and of giving real added value to 
European initiatives cannot be attained, and the choice to intervene will 
only result in further bureaucratic burdens, delays and coordination 
difficulties. These problems can only be completely eliminated if the EU 
resists the temptation to get directly involved. Anyway, they can be eased 
if the EU takes over full responsibility for a sector, for instance law-
enforcement of police. 
In this case, for instance if EUCIVPOL is included in a UN-led mission, 
the C
2 system mentioned above maintains its validity, although some 
tasks (at the upper operational level) should be more centralised, to 
enable the EU intervene more directly to “protect” its forces and its 
prestige. In this case the Deputy HR/SG for Police could directly take 
over the command of EUCIVPOL intervention and the predesignated 
Chief Commissioner/Police Commander would become his deputy. The 
Head of the EU Police Unit in Brussels would act as a liaison between the 
Deputy HR/SG and the EU bodies. 
Of course these are extremely delicate issues that involve strong political 
sensitivities. The participation of EU member states in other international 
agencies does not pass through the Union, especially since some of them 
enjoy a more prestigious status in these agencies – from the Security 
Council to the informal Contact Group, whose role and influence within 
OSCE is growing – than they do within the EU.   
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CHAPTER 6 
EUCIVPOL DOCTRINE, PRINCIPLES AND 
ORGANISATION – COORDINATION ISSUES 
6.1  Doctrine 
EUCIVPOL’s doctrine should include the general principles applicable 
not only to the employment of civilian police forces in conflict prevention 
and crisis management, but also to all possible cases in which 
EUCIVPOL or some of its individual components may be deployed – 
from the total responsibility for law enforcement to the monitoring of 
local police or assistance in its restructuring, recruiting, selection, 
education, training and equipment. Clearly, the doctrine should take past 
experiences into account, especially regarding the various organisational 
models adopted by civilian police forces in external interventions. 
Different provisions could be envisaged for the cases in which the 
intervention as a whole or its policing sector are under direct EU 
responsibility or are led by another international organisation. 
The doctrine should include: 
•  A code of conduct, which may be similar in its form  – albeit, of 
course, different in contents  – to that of the military forces as 
expressed in the OSCE’s Vienna Document 94. It should clarify the 
concept of “democratic policing” and should be consistent with the 
doctrines for civilian police forces that are currently being developed 
by UNDPKO. 
•  A list of ROE, referring both to the use of force in public order and 
anti-riot intervention and to the use of non-lethal force during arrests, 
anti-crime and anti-terrorist actions. The new concept under 
discussion is that, whilst the ROE for the military are essentially 
reactive, ROE for police must be proactive, aiming at preventing the 
occurrence and, possibly, to react to it if prevention fails. Clearly, this 
refers to situations in which a basic degree of security and 
paramilitary group disarmament has already been reached. 
•  SOFAs and SOMAs. 
•  Procedures regulating police cooperation with the military forces, 
which should be agreed with the European Military Staff and should 
be harmonised with NATO-CIMIC provisions, with the legislation on CARLO JEAN 
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military units cooperation in public order maintenance and the 
relevant UN legislation. 
•  Criminal procedure legislation with which the EUCIVPOL should 
comply in law enforcement functions. 
•  Particular provisions for special police actions: border control, traffic 
control, local police monitoring, financial police, etc.  
The EU authorities responsible for an intervention or the European Chief 
Commissioner should issue executive orders on the basis of the doctrine. 
The doctrine should be used to train special police units or the “police 
officers” earmarked by the EU member countries or EU-associated 
countries to generate the specific EUCIVPOL task force to be employed 
in each particular intervention. 
6.2  Intelligence 
The intelligence issue is crucial, but at the same time it is difficult to 
solve in all international organisations, irrespective of their degree of 
integration. In fact, intelligence activities are rigidly restricted to the 
national level only. However, even if they are not integrated, they should 
operate as closely as possible. 
As a general rule, in the prevention and management of crises, most of 
which are internal to the involved state, the civilian and military aspects 
are closely intertwined and must be managed by the same intelligence 
agency. Most EU member countries have an internal and an external 
intelligence agency. Many of them also have specialised criminal 
intelligence agencies, for instance in the anti-drug and anti-crime sectors. 
By concentrating all military and civilian political -strategic planning 
activities in the hands of the COPS/PSC, the establishment of a single EU 
Intelligence Office would become possible. The office would receive and, 
if n ecessary, request the data it needs to produce evaluations for the 
HR/SG and the other EU leading bodies, as well as to make forecasts, 
produce scenarios, update information situation reports and identify 
intelligence needs. 
In case of autonomously EU-led intervention, a specialised group capable 
of gathering the information transmitted by the member states, by the 
forces deployed in the field and by the COPS/PSC, re-transmitting it to 
the involved bodies and defining intelligence needs should also be 
established within the EU Special Representative’s staff. AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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Intelligence activities in both the military and the civilian aspects of EU 
conflict prevention and crisis management should be the subject matter of 
Memoranda of Understanding between the General Affairs Council (or 
the reinforced COPS/PSC) and the various EU member states. Periodical 
meetings of the National Intelligence Directors of the EU member 
countries should be envisaged, on the model of similar NATO 
procedures. 
In this respect, it must be stressed that, unlike UN-led 1
st generation 
peacekeeping operations, 2
nd generation operations, including those 
implementing the first two Petersberg missions, cannot be impartial. In 
fact, their objectives are pacification and therefore the transformation of 
institutions and society, state reconstruction, democratisation and the 
respect of human rights.
2 Because of their nature, these interventions 
require intelligence-gathering. The intelligence issue, which generally is 
taboo in UN-led interventions, should not be such for the EU. Therefore, 
the intelligence sector must be viewed as completely legitimised to carry 
out its activities, which in all cases will continue to be developed by the 
individual member states. In other words, an intelligence fusion centre 
must be established both at European level and at the level of the 
authority responsible for the intervention, retaining the opportunity to 
receive intelligence directly or on request from the member states. 
Since there is a close relationship between the military and the civilian 
aspects in the Petersberg interventions, since most of them are related to 
internal conflicts and since the involved national intelligence agencies are 
those operating in “external” intelligence, in the first phase it seems 
preferable to unify all intelligence activities in the military, public-
security, internal order, anti-criminal and anti-terrorist sectors into a 
single body. Only anti-criminal intelligence, which is related to criminal 
investigations, should be autonomous, but this should apply only to the 
later phases of intervention. In the initial phases, the links between 
politics, terrorism, organised crime, etc. are very strong and the unity of 
threat should logically be countered with a unity of response. Unity 
should be i mplemented both at the political-strategic level and the 
operational-tactical one, that is, in the theatre. Clearly, this especially 
applies to EU-led operations. 
                                                                 
2 Whilst humanitarian interventions must be neutral and impartial, supporting the 
victims and their persecutors alike, the guarantee of human rights cannot be 
either impartial or neutral, because it involves change in the ethical, political and 
institutional behaviour. CARLO JEAN 
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6.3  Financial Police 
International crisis management interventions, ranging from humanitarian 
emergencies to post-conflict rehabilitation, are always confronted with 
situations marked by massive economic criminality and corruption. Since 
the EU is the most important, or one of the most important, sources of 
economic aid, and since effective stabilisation closely depends on the 
disruption of the ties that typically mark post-conflict situations between 
political and criminal circles, which cooperate in retaining control over 
the population, the economy and the territory, as well as over the success 
of anti-corruption activities, a critical role is played by intelligence, 
investigation and law enforcement in the financial sector. 
The most crucial aspects of the war on criminality and corruption are 
effective control of the banking system and financial transactions, both 
internal and directed towards international “safe havens”. These already 
represent an important activity sector of the financial institutions, the 
national police forces and Europol. The international and European 
financial institutions, as well as the Intelligence Services and the Criminal 
Investigation Agencies, control the use that is made of financial aid, also 
availing themselves of auditors. Providing EUCIVPOL with an 
investigative branch specialising in the economic-financial sector may 
play a critical role in determining the long-term success of EU 
interventions and especially the successful transfer of powers from the 
international organisations to the local institutions and officials. To this 
end, the principle of “conditionality” should be progressively replaced by 
that of “ownership”, which requires increased effectiveness, 
accountability and transparency in the local institutions. Actually, this is 
the only way in which economic, but also psychological or institutional 
“dependency complexes”, which would force the international 
community to prolong its presence, can be prevented. The activities 
carried out by the ECMM (European Commission Monitoring Mission), 
the World Bank and the American FBI in BiH, as well as the police and 
military raid at the Herzegovska Banka, may be an interesting case study. 
The financial police should extend their activities to the customs sector, 
to fiscal matters and to surveillance on land and sea borders (against 
smuggling, drug and human trafficking, etc.), as well as at airports. They 
should also provide assistance in rehabilitating this specialised sector – 
not only regarding police forces, but the institutions as a whole – in the 
states in which the EU intervenes. The experiences acquired in Albania 
may be useful for defining deployment criteria for European financial 
police forces.  AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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The issue of the police forces highlights the fact that the headline goals 
for EUCIVPOL cannot be merely quantitative, but should also contain 
qualitative specifications, so as to enable the European authorities 
responsible for the intervention to modulate them according to the 
vocation, specialisation and available capabilities of the member states. 
6.4  Composition of the Available Forces for EUCIVPOL 
It has already been remarked that civilian police forces in the various EU 
states may have different statutes. In many member countries, centrally-
directed, state-level police are only a limited percentage of the total 
police forces. Therefore, these countries meet greater difficulties in 
earmarking police personnel for EUCIVPOL.  
In this respect, it must be underlined that the decision taken by all 
European Councils since Helsinki, to establish a European data-base 
containing all the available police contingents of the m ember states, 
seems only moderately useful in defining EUCIVPOL’s national 
contributions in the different sectors of specialisation. They depend less 
on the total potentialities than on the willingness and capability of the 
member countries to contribute f orces, which can substantially vary 
according to the internal situation of each member state at any given 
moment, especially regarding public order and security needs. Police 
forces are in short supply, and are usually all engaged within the national 
territory. 
From this point of view, the issue is radically different from that of 
military forces. It is impossible to define European convergence criteria 
(which are already debatable as far as military burden-sharing is 
concerned), not to mention standards in the contributions to EUCIVPOL. 
The table on the following page illustrates the ratios between the military 
and the police contribution pledges by the EU member countries. 
Member countries providing a military contribution in excess of 8% of 
their total police forces are, in decreasing order, Germany, the UK, 
France, Italy and Spain. Police force contributions are higher for 
continental countries, whilst the UK pledged less forces. The rotational 
lead-nation principle with blocs of states might be the best option to 
balance contributions and responsibilities with authority of employment. CARLO JEAN 
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Military and Police Forces Offered by EU Members Countries 
Member 
State 
Military 
Forces 
Percent of 
Total EU 
Mil. Forces 
Police 
Forces 
Percent of Total 
EU Police 
Forces 
Austria  2,000  3.3  110  2.1 
Belgium  4,000  1.7  120  2.3 
Denmark  -  -  125  2.4 
Finland  2,000  3.3  75  1.4 
France  12,000  18.5  806  15.2 
Germany  13,500  20.4  860  16.2 
Greece  3,500  5.3  150  2.8 
Ireland  1,000  1.7  60  1.2 
Italy  6,000  9.1  1,100  20.1 
Luxemburg  100  0.15  6  0.1 
Netherlands  5,000  7.6  133  2.5 
Portugal  1,000  1.7  345  5.8 
Spain  6,000  9.1  500  9.4 
Sweden  1,500  2.3  170  3 
UK  12,500  18.5  450  8.4 
Total  66,100    5.300   
Source:  Author’s personal  elaboration from different EU Commission press 
communiqués. 
As regards the employment of the available forces for EUCIVPOL, the 
EU should decide whether it should adopt the UN  orientation of 
preferring multinationality even at the level of small teams in charge of 
monitoring the local police and of direct investigation activities, or opt 
for national criteria in the subdivision of intervention areas. Grounds of 
efficiency seem to make the second solution preferable, especially in the 
initial phase of the interventions. It would thereby be possible to simplify 
logistics support and national responsibility. The multinationality solution 
guarantees higher impartiality, but increases coordination problems. 
Nevertheless, it should be preferred as soon as the situation has been 
stabilised. AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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Moreover, each country has its own special set of vocations, which stem 
from the historical evolution of its police forces and which would enable 
national specialisation criteria to be adopted for EUCIVPOL. For 
instance, the availability of military-statute general police forces makes 
some member states, such as Italy and France, especially suited to take 
over public order and security tasks in cooperation with military forces 
and under the military commander, as has happened in Bosnia for the 
MSU. 
Moreover, Italy, for instance, has a military-statute economic and 
financial police corps, the Guardia di Finanza, which also specialises in 
the control of land borders and anti-smuggling activities. The 
Scandinavian countries boast a long-standing tradition in democratic 
policing and the respect of human rights, and have many available 
experts in these areas (although – alas – they often seem to believe that 
the intervention areas have a cultural environment similar to Scandinavia, 
which has led to rather peculiar results!). 
A solution which has been tested in some sectors, such as education and 
health care, and whose usefulness may be evaluated for EUCIVPOL, is 
having police responsibility areas coincide with those of the armed forces 
from the same nation. Responsibility areas are usually assigned to the 
main European countries, which provide the largest military contingents. 
This solution would make cooperation between the armed forces and 
police much easier, although it may fuel frustration by minor member 
countries, which would be excluded from the positions of greatest 
responsibility. The problem may be solved, however, at least in part, by 
carefully combining national contingents (by means of bilateral, trilateral, 
etc. agreements among the EU member states) and by implementing a 
rotational principle for command, which may also yield training and 
personal relations benefits. It must be noted nevertheless that the reason 
why the UN pursues multinationality at all levels is that the police forces 
supplied by its member states are so heterogeneous that it is preferred to 
have at least one police officer from the most democratic countries in 
each team. This problem does not exist within the EU, since the police 
forces of all its member states have fairly homogeneous and very high 
quality standards. 
The opportunity should be examined of associating the police forces of 
some large cities or regions or of EU member states with same-statute 
local police in the intervention areas. At a first assessment, this 
opportunity may simply be used as a back-up to EUCIVPOL 
intervention, which must carry out its interventions on the basis of the CARLO JEAN 
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contingents supplied by the various states. At any rate, coordination 
difficulties are bound to arise also because the municipal and regional 
police forces would obviously not enjoy the same legitimisation of those 
supplied to the EU by the member states. 
Therefore, the use of the potential related to the possession of special 
capabilities and vocations by individual states – the case of the Italian 
Guardia di Finanza – seems more promising. Since EUCIVPOL will be 
called upon to carry out a vast range of specialised tasks, the availability 
of national units possessing a particular specialisation, which should be 
systematically earmarked for it, may reinforce and improve its role. At 
the same time, however, the risk, implicit in any state specialisation of 
roles, should be kept in mind that a particular sector may fail to be 
covered if the relevant state decides that it will not take part in the 
intervention. However, although the use of  police must remain at an 
intergovernmental level, some forms of reduction of the strict national 
sovereignty principle can be envisaged, such as qualified-majority voting 
on EUCIVPOL employment and financial contributions by those states 
that are unable to honour their force contribution pledges. 
6.5  External Experts and NGOs 
Democratic policing requires the availability not only of the law 
enforcement package or “triad” but also of legal experts, to support or 
replace the local authorities in harmonising t he local criminal and 
criminal procedure law to European standards. Moreover, there is a need 
for experts in areas that overlap with those of democratic policing. For 
instance, experts in human rights are needed, especially in the sector of 
the respect of the rights of suspects and indicted persons (particularly in 
the pre-trial stage) and to ensure the impartiality of the whole judicial 
system. In post-internal conflict situations, the local judiciary, far from 
being independent, is often politicised. It is subordinated, de facto, to the 
police or to the paramilitary groups, which are the main instrument used 
by the local faction leaders to retain their power. All of them are at the 
service of the political factions, not of the public. 
The availability of experts in these sectors should be considered in the 
force pledges by the EU member states, and the bodies in charge of the 
civilian aspects of European interventions should identify deficiencies 
(especially qualitative ones) so as to stimulate the member s tates to 
provide the needed capacities. In this respect, support by the Council of 
Europe and by some specialised NGOs, with which the EU may conclude 
agreements and cooperate, may prove valuable. An OSCE REACT-type AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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organisation could be extremely useful i n this respect and could also 
involve professional organisations (lawyers, judges, university 
professors, etc.) as well as police officers capable of carrying out 
effective criminal investigations. Generally, the EU peace intervention 
areas have just undergone a civil war and their ethical-juridical culture 
and psychological-social structures are considerably different from those 
of the EU. Experts are a more common asset, but they cannot be used in 
the place of judges and prosecutors, who are always in short supply and 
may meet cultural difficulties in operating within societies whose 
juridical culture is different from their own. Therefore, it is necessary to 
integrate local personnel into the law enforcement package as soon as 
possible. Police officers could be employed as prosecutors as an 
emergency measure, whilst Western prosecutors could be pooled with the 
judges in order to avoid situations such as occurred, for instance, in 
Kosovo. 
NGOs can provide useful human resources, e.g. public defence lawyers 
and experts in the respect of human rights or in anti-corruption controls 
(suffice it to mention the important action carried out by Transparency 
International). 
The presence and the role of NGOs have increased enormously. Some 
commentators have even suggested – especially in the cases of BiH and 
Kosovo – that a “shadow government of NGOs” has been established. 
The NGOs play a decisive role in emergencies, where the most important 
of them – about 20 out of a total of 40,000 registered at the UN, half of 
which are American and the other half European  – are used as the 
executive arm of international agencies, which are much more 
bureaucratised and rigid. The latter therefore are much less suited to 
tackle unforeseen events with the speed required in humanitarian 
emergencies. As a whole, it does not seem possible to involve them in 
police force activities, also because of cultural problems. Indeed, some 
NGOs have psychological difficulties in accepting that the reinforcement 
of the state – including its coercive powers – has the highest priority in 
stabilisation. Moreover, it would be hard to impose standardised 
procedures on them. Nevertheless, their help may prove useful in other 
sectors of the law-enforcement and security packages. The EU should 
make every effort to promote the growth and the European transnational 
character of the existing large NGOs that dominate the sector (in the 
Kosovo emergency, the 20 main NGOs, which are becoming increasingly 
similar to multinational corporations, had the responsibility of almost 
75% of the total humanitarian aid).  CARLO JEAN 
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6.6  European Funding 
In the military sector, the EU may create a common fund, which could be 
included or not within the Union’s general budget, to fund special 
programmes such as the Torrejon satellite centre, or C
4IRSTA 
capabilities, or rapid-reaction forces strategic air transport assets, etc. 
However, the financial burden of the various states’ military 
contributions will fall almost completely on the single European 
countries and will be one of the main factors determining the definition 
and management of the ESDP. In the military sector, the European states 
will use, de facto, capabilities that are already available to them and that 
can be employed in external interventions because they are not engaged 
for national needs at that particular moment. 
On the other hand, as far as EUCIVPOL – but also other components of 
the security and law-enforcement packages – is concerned, the resources 
needed for European interventions are generally additional to those 
necessary to meet the ordinary national needs. Police are usually 
anchored in the national territory, and the forces that are sent abroad must 
be removed from their normal institutional activities. This may pose 
considerable problems in the selection of personnel, considering the 
reluctance of the states to lose, even on a temporary basis, their most 
valid personnel. The ideal solution would to convince the member states 
to increase their normal police forces, so that it would be possible to 
“earmark” the elements needed for international interventions on a 
dedicated basis. Unfortunately, it seems realistic to assume that the least 
qualified personnel will be earmarked for international interventions, with 
the exception, of course, of the commanding officers, who are crucial for 
the visibility and prestige of their country. 
An example in case is provided by the IPTF in BiH, in which older, 
retired policemen were employed, whose physical endurance and 
psychological capability to adjust to the particular situation were reduced. 
The idea of hiring a private company – the Texas-based subsidiary of the 
British Dyn Corp  – to select, recruit, provide basic training and also 
manage discipline for the American police contingent (about 160 police 
officers over a total of 1,800 in the IPTF) caused several problems, which 
had a negative impact on the image and credibility of the international 
action in BiH as a whole. This experience must not be repeated, despite 
the currently growing trend to use private companies to meet the needs of 
ever-larger sectors of public intervention. 
Apart from the NGOs, whose important role has already been described, 
this trend has also emerged in the military sector. In this respect, the AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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desire of avoiding an overly direct involvement by the governments 
played a role, as well as the wish to overcome excessively intrusive 
Parliamentary controls, which are deemed incompatible with the 
flexibility demanded by the unpredictable, rapidly evolving situations 
that have marked the “resumption of history” since the end of the Cold 
War. Private military companies such as the American MPRI, which was 
employed in Croatia and BiH, are undergoing a revival. In my opinion, 
the use of civilian companies also in the logistics sector (from strategic 
transportation, hiring the Russian and Ukrainian Air Transport Fleet, to 
catering and supplies) is bound to expand. 
All the problems that have emerged in the past international 
interventions, as well as the fact that civilian police employment is a 
crucial sector for the EU – since NATO will continue to play a dominant, 
if not exclusive, role in the military sector – seem to indicate that the 
creation of European common funding is critical for EUCIVPOL. A 
special emergency Commission fund or government contribution to the 
union for operating costs could be envisaged (for instance, it could cover 
one-third of the total cost of the countries’ contribution, and the total 
costs for the exercises decided by the EU).  
Whilst operating costs should be included in the Community budget, 
since they are recurrent, procurement costs should be met by means of 
contributions by the member countries outside the EU budget. This will 
stimulate national contributions. 
6.7  Non-Lethal Weapons 
Especially in the extremely tense situation marking the aftermath of a 
civil war, when the wish for revenge still dominates and (not only light) 
weapons and explosives are widespread throughout the territory, the 
effectiveness of public security depends first of all on the credibility of 
the international community’s will to use all the necessary force to create 
or restore order.  
Especially in the stage before a reasonable degree of disarmament of the 
paramilitary faction has been achieved, it is paramount that the 
international police forces are supported by the military. Otherwise, their 
firepower risks being overwhelmed. In the early stages of an intervention, 
actual counter-guerrilla operations or offensive actions to disarm the 
paramilitary groups may be necessary. In such cases, the military must be 
entrusted with the responsibility for the operations, whilst the police 
forces in the field should support them, also by providing technical CARLO JEAN 
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advice to the military commanders. Once again, it must be stressed that 
no artificial barrier must be created. 
Problems arise, however, especially in identifying how far the use of 
force is acceptable and in determining if the police forces should take part 
in these enforcement operations, if they should wait and see, or if they 
should begin to prepare their specialised actions based on democratic 
policing, prevention, etc.  – which, at the beginning, are only wishful 
thinking. It is difficult to elaborate general regulations. The relevant 
decision should be taken on a case-by-case basis. In my opinion, 
however, synergy and cooperation should be implemented from the 
beginning. 
Some commentators maintain that greater recourse should be made to the 
new technologies of non-lethal or reduced-lethality weapons both by 
military and police units. According to many experts, however, these new 
weapons do not solve the basic problem. In fact, they limit losses in the 
armed groups and among the local population, but their systematic use 
reduces the deterrent value of the international force, thus encouraging 
attacks. Therefore, in a long-term perspective, their use may increase 
casualties, instead of reducing them, because decreased deterrence 
prolongs instability and makes successive interventions necessary. 
Although each individual intervention causes fewer casualties, both 
among the local population and among law-enforcement forces, in the 
end the total casualties may be higher. 
The debate on non-lethal weapons is not strictly technical. It is mainly 
political, and it is too important for the EU decision-makers to ignore. 
Apart from the intrinsic effectiveness of such weapons, their availability 
and initial use may make a later use of lethal force more justified and 
legitimate. 
It must also be noted that non-lethal weapons technologies are rapidly 
evolving, and their effectiveness may substantially increase, as both the 
US Marines Corps and the US Department of Justice have highlighted. A 
common European funding system also in the R&D sector may be taken 
into consideration. Detailed studies should be made on this subject, 
analysing their ethical-juridical aspects along with the political-strategic-
operational and technical ones. 
Similar studies should be funded in the sector of the new protection 
measures, since the need to reduce international personnel losses is 
paramount in all interventions. The spectre of the “Mogadishu line” 
haunts those responsible for Western interventions – maybe too much. 
This deprives the West of a considerable stabilisation capability. AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
 
 
65 
6.8 Europol, the Central European Police Academy, the 
Association of European Police Colleges, the WEU Institute 
for Security Studies, etc. 
Like the European Chief Commissioners Task Force, the Europol and the 
planned CEPA may also play an important role in the establishment, 
training effectiveness and development of EUCIVPOL’s doctrine. 
The action of Europol may especially focus on the legislation sector as 
well as on operational support (along with the Lion Group, the K4, etc.) 
in special sectors, such as anti-drug and anti-terrorism activities. 
In turn, the CEPA may provide assistance in training and intermediate-
level education, with assistance by the AEPC. The EU should take into 
account the proposal formulated by the Special Working Group 
established by Table III.B.V of the Stability Pact about the Regional 
Police Training Initiative, presented during its 23-24 October 2001 
seminar in Bucharest. 
The WEU Institute for Security Studies may be entrusted with conducting 
basic research to support decisions on the structure and legislation of 
EUCIVPOL, analysing past experiences, examining and assessing case 
studies and organising seminars and workshops to promote a culture on 
this particular sector of the CFSP/ESDP. 
6.9  Selection of Police Officers for EUCIVPOL 
The experiences made in the interventions in Croatia (UNTAES), BiH 
(IPTF and MSU) and Kosovo (UNMIK Police and OSCE KPS School) 
show the pivotal importance of providing personnel not only with 
excellent professional experience, fluent English and basic driving 
abilities, but also with excellent personal and professional qualities as 
well as with an aptitude to cooperate in an international environment. The 
involved states often provided a certain percentage of unfit personnel. 
Since police forces operate in small teams, within the local societies and 
in close contact with the local police forces they have to monitor, even a 
small number of unsuitable personnel may have a negative impact on the 
credibility, and therefore on the effectiveness, of the whole international 
intervention. This aspect is much more delicate for police than for 
military forces, who always operate in relatively large national units 
rather than on an individual basis. 
Therefore, careful selection is crucial to ensure that the police officers 
actually meet the requested standards. Not all states are capable of 
carrying out such a selection. Obviously, police officers in charge of CARLO JEAN 
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monitoring or conducting direct investigative activities in the criminal or 
in the financial sector must have higher personal and professional 
qualities that those belonging to public order units, whose problems are 
simpler, since they are similar to those of the military forces. 
Apart from the excellent standards of their police forces, the problem of 
rejecting unfit personnel is not as difficult for EU member states as for 
the UN. The latter is forced to recruit personnel also from totalitarian or 
developing countries by its multinationality principle. However, 
EUCIVPOL is faced by a similar problem, at least regarding the non-
member states from which the Union requests, or which offer, force 
contributions. 
A selection centre adopting the same rules used by the UN may be very 
useful. It may coincide with the centre established in Zagreb, which 
might be consolidated. As an alternative, a local police selection centre 
may be created, as happened in BiH and Kosovo. At any rate, cooperation 
by member states is crucial, because they must autonomously adopt the 
selection criteria envisaged for EUCIVPOL. 
However, a form of safeguard must be established for those responsible 
and for the Senior Commissioner/Police Commander in the intervention 
areas. In case of EUCIVPOL intervention, legal rules should be 
established (which may be included in the code of conduct) envisaging 
the possibility of disciplinary and administrative sanctions by the EU 
authorities – clearly, with the involvement of and in coordination with the 
national people responsible. Naturally, such powers cannot be entrusted 
to the local institutions, since international police officers must be able to 
operate safely with the needed i mpartiality, and must therefore have 
guarantees and immunities similar to those granted to diplomats. On the 
other hand, simply sending home police officers who committed 
disciplinary offences or crimes is not enough. At a minimum, it should be 
arranged that the providing country pays a fine into the EU budget, and 
can later demand compensation from the police officer responsible. 
Clearly, these measures are extraordinary: they are justified by the 
exceptional performances required of police officers, especially those in 
charge of “contact policing”, monitoring and direct investigations, and by 
the risk that inappropriate behaviour, even by few policemen, may 
undermine the image and credibility of the whole European intervention, 
damaging all the involved countries. 
The level of integration that has been achieved in the EU should make 
these measures applicable, whilst they are normally impracticable within 
other types of intergovernmental cooperation. If the EU can solve this AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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issue effectively, the added value of EUCIVPOL as against the simple 
sum of national contributions would increase dramatically, because it 
would be a real force, not a mere patchwork of national contributions.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1  Summary 
Apart from the specific issues and proposals it contains, the single most 
important concept expressed in this report is that the rehabilitation of the 
State, including its coercive power, is essential for peace and stability. 
The second main concept is the need to be fully aware of the ties 
connecting security and development and to create highly decentralised 
organisations, providing them with enough flexibility to be able to adjust 
to the unpredictability, complexity and uniqueness of any situation. 
In order to play an international role commensurate with its ambitions, 
interests and political, economic and cultural weight, Europe must first of 
all implement the fundamental principle of unity of command at the 
various levels. At the leadership level, there is an urgent need to put an 
end to the duality between the European Council and the Commission, 
which has played a significant role in the inefficiency of the initiatives of 
the European Union on the international scene following the September 
11
th attacks and the crisis of CFSP and ESDP. 
At a political-strategic level, there is a need to improve coordination 
between the military and the civilian aspects of conflict and crisis 
prevention. In particular, Europe must not renounce its competitive 
advantage of having all-round competences and resources, which would 
enable it to implement unity of direction and management of 
interventions that are closely related to each other. 
In particular, it is essential to improve coordination between military and 
police forces by overcoming the ideological approach, supported by some 
member countries, according to which the two are incompatible. Not only 
do such approaches make it impossible to meet the challenges that have 
to be faced, especially in the initial phases of emergency, but they have 
repeatedly proved poorly efficient – if not outright disastrous – during the 
interventions in the Balkans. 
EUCIVPOL’s importance will be heightened by the impossibility for the 
EU to meet the deadlines for the Helsinki Headline Goal FOCs in the 
military sector. Their achievement is prevented by dwindling defence 
budgets, combined with increased financial burdens for the transition 
from conscription to volunteer-based forces in many armed forces in 
continental Europe. Moreover, the European identity for military AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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interventions will always be limited by the need to have access to NATO 
assets as well as by the divergent stances by the EU member states on the 
levels of political-strategic autonomy the Union should pursue. 
EUCIVPOL, on the other hand, can achieve full operational readiness 
without major difficulties and can be established on schedule. Therefore, 
it will become a fundamental instrument of European presence and 
visibility in the international context. 
EUCIVPOL will be able to operate, also in the public order and security 
maintenance sector, only if the other two elements of the law-
enforcement triad, that is, the judiciary and the penitentiary systems, are 
also operational. The system’s full operational readiness creates very 
delicate problems since, unlike the military forces, EUCIVPOL and the 
other two triad components operate from within the involved societies, 
rather than outside of them, with a bottom-up rather than a top-down 
approach. Consequently, the effectiveness of their action requires a very 
deep understanding of the local cultures and realities, which can only be 
achieved by means of cooperation by local elements, which therefore 
should be attained as soon as possible. 
There are essentially two cases for EUCIVPOL action: 
•  Substitution of the local police forces, if the intervention area 
governmental and administrative structures have collapsed or are 
inexistent; and 
•  Assistance to the local forces, including monitoring their efficiency 
as well as their compliance with human rights and democratic 
policing rules. At any rate, the second case is also one of the 
following phases in the first. 
After the emergency interventions have been carried out, EUCIVPOL 
must aim at implementing a progressive transition of power and 
responsibility to the local authorities, according to the rules envisaged by 
a doctrine which should be flexible enough to adjust to the circumstances. 
During this extremely delicate stage, the unity of the law-enforcement 
triad must not be disrupted, and the transition must be closely related to 
the political -institutional changes aimed at transferring powers to the 
local authorities, so as to achieve a self-sustaining stabilisation: the law-
enforcement triad, and especially the police forces, must always have 
very clear political counterparts. 
These mechanisms must be envisaged by a doctrine that is compatible – 
preferably coinciding  – with those of the UN and the OSCE, and CARLO JEAN 
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EUCIVPOL personnel must be adequately selected and trained to 
implement them. The problem of command and control in EU-led or non-
EU-led operations plays a central role. In particular, political, strategic, 
operational or theatre and tactical planning and management capabilities 
must be foreseen. In particular, in order to guarantee intervention 
effectiveness and rapidity, a HQ provided with the necessary C
3 
capabilities should be envisaged to direct in-theatre EUCIVPOL 
contingents. Moreover, the General Affairs Council staff bodies should 
be adequately enhanced and provided with the capability to dispatch an 
advanced party in the field as soon as possible, to assess force 
requirements and to define the doctrine to be employed. The advanced 
force should be incorporated into the EUCIVPOL theatre command after 
it has been deployed. 
A similar organisation should be envisaged in case of n on-EU-led 
operations, although in such cases it would be desirable that the EU does 
not interfere in the direct contacts between the single states and the 
leading international organisation, in order to avoid complications, delays 
and red tape. 
Special importance must be attached to the intelligence sector, by 
identifying the best types and mechanisms of cooperation, and to 
economic-financial police, which must always be a key component in the 
interventions both to combat crime and corruption and to rehabilitate and 
stabilise the states in which the intervention is carried out. 
7.2  Recommendations 
1.  Developing, within the EU, a realistic political-strategic culture of 
crisis management that rejects the fashionable fiction of cooperation 
and goodwill by the local political authorities and ethnic groups in 
implementing the international agenda of pacification, rehabilitation 
and westernisation. Giving high priority to the reconstruction of the 
state and of its coercive power, relinquishing the unfounded idea that 
the transition from pre-modern to post-modern states can be carried 
out instantly. 
2.  Creating structures, at the political and strategic level, that can 
provide unity of command:  
a)  between the General Affairs Council and the Commission; 
b)  at theatre-of-intervention level; and 
c)  between the military and civilian aspects of crisis management and 
intervention. AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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3.  To achieve point 2 a), the following seems necessary: 
a)  Providing the HR/SG with the double hat of EU Commissioner or, as 
an alternative, giving the role of HR/SG to the President of the 
Commission. 
b)  In the first case, the HR/SG should chair the COPS/PSC; in the 
second case, chairman role would be given to the Commissioner for 
CFSP/ESDP. 
c)  Providing the COPS/PSC with the configuration of a European 
Security Council, giving it executive powers towards the in-theatre 
EU Special Representative and 360° responsibilities (both military 
and civilian). To this effect, structures mirroring those of the military 
MS should be established also for EUCIVPOL, taking into account 
that its action is more decentralised (bottom-up rather than top-down) 
and more linked to the peculiarities of each society, because the 
police operate within it, not from without. Moreover, EUCIVPOL 
could benefit of an external planning capability like that of SHAPE 
used by the military component. 
d)  The Police Unit should be expanded, subordinated to a Deputy 
HR/SG for Police Affairs and organised so as to be able to provide 
strategic assessment and force generation as well to immediately 
dispatch an advanced party in the theatre which can be incorporated 
in the HQ of the EU Head of Petersberg Mission. 
4.  To achieve point 2b), it seems necessary to designate an EU Special 
Representative for each EU-led intervention. He or she should be 
subordinated to the HR/SG, have an all-round role and be assisted by 
a joint military civilian staff mirroring the COPS/PSC. 
5.  To achieve point 2 c), extreme flexibility seems necessary in 
reinforcing the COPS. In the first stages of an intervention, until the 
environment has become sufficiently secure, EUCIVPOL should be 
subordinated to the military command, whilst in the following stage – 
which should be established as soon as possible – the relationship 
could be reverted by means of the procedures established in BiH and 
in Kosovo for the Blue Box (the MSU was given tactical control 
(TACCON) of military forces in its area of responsibility for a given 
period). 
6.  The Council of Europe, a few relevant NGOs and bilateral 
associations between Western and local municipalities and regions 
could provide EUCIVPOL with important expertise in different 
fields. CARLO JEAN 
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7.  The member states’ reluctance to provide police forces and to take 
over direct law-enforcement tasks, rather than merely monitoring the 
local police, may create quantitative but primarily q ualitative 
difficulties for EUCIVPOL. Creating standards (similar to the 
convergence criteria for the euro) to overcome them will be difficult. 
In any case, a common funding mechanism should be provided both 
for the police forces and for some capacities of the military ones. 
Moreover, some system of fines could be defined for the member 
states that do not comply with their contribution pledges.  
8.  The EU negotiations on EUCIVPOL must be consistent with those of 
UNDPKO and those of the CPC of OSCE (REACT). The Europol, 
the Central European Police Academy, the Association of European 
Police Colleges and the WEU Institute for Security Studies should 
support the initiative. 
9.  EUCIVPOL must extend its responsibility to the sectors of 
economic-financial crime and corruption, with the support of the 
IFI/EIB/EBRD, etc. This sector plays a pivotal role in both post-
conflict rehabilitation and in the reconstruction of a failed state.  
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AEPC  Association of European Policy Colleges 
AMF(L)  ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force (Land) 
AOR  Area of Responsibility 
BiH  Bosnia-Herzegovina 
C³  Command and Communications Control 
C
4IRSTA  Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target 
Acquisition  
CEP  Civil Emergency Planning 
CEPA  Central European Policy Academy 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIMIC  Civil-Military Cooperation 
CIVPOL  Civic Police 
COPS/PSC  Comité Politique et de Securité/Political and Security 
Committee 
CPC  Conflict Prevention Centre 
CPX  Command Post Exercises 
CRS  Compagnies Republiquaines de Securité 
DCI  Defence Capabilities Initiative 
EAPC  Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ECMM  European Commission Monitoring Mission 
EIB  European Investment Bank 
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy 
EUCIVPOL  EU Civil Police Force 
EUMC  European Union Military Council 
EUMS  EU Military Staff 
FBI   Federal Bureau of Investigation CARLO JEAN 
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FOC  Full Operation Capabilities 
FTX  Field Exercises 
FYROM  Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia 
HR/SG  High Representative/Secretary General 
HUMINT  Human Intelligence 
HQ  Headquarters 
IC  International Community 
IFI  International Financial Institutions 
IGC  International Crisis Group 
IOC  Initial Operational Capabilities 
IPTF  International Police Task Force 
KPS  Kosovo Police Service 
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding 
MSU  Multinational Specialised Units 
NAC  North Atlantic Council 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisations 
OIO  Other International Organisations 
OPLAN  Operational Plans 
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PC  Policy Commissioner/Police Commander 
PfP  Partnership for Peace 
PSC  Political and Security Committee 
REACT  Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams 
ROE  Rules of Engagement 
RRC  Rapid Reaction Capabilities 
RRF  Rapid Reaction Forces 
SACEUR  Supreme Commander Europe 
SECI  Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative 
SEEBRIG  South-Eastern Europe Brigade AN INTEGRATED CIVIL POLICE FORCE FOR THE EU 
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SFOR  Stabilisation Force 
SIGINT  Signal Intelligence 
SOFA  Status of Forces Agreement NO S 
SOMA  Status of Mission Agreement NO S 
SOP  Standing Operating Procedures 
STANAG NO C  Standardization Agreement 
TACCON  Tactical Control 
TECHINT  Technical Intelligence 
UNDPKO  United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
UNCIVPOL  United Nations Civil Police 
UNMIBiH  United Nations Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
UNMIK  United Nations Mission to Kosovo 
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force 
UNTAES  United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern 
Slavonia 